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In 1987, Greenwald and Stiglitz accused Keynes’s summary of the General Theory in chapter 18 of 
relying upon ‚neoclassical and Marshallian tools‛. A number of contributions have on the contrary 
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A Treatise on Probability. It thereby shows that the notions of cause and dependence used to discuss 
the relationships between independent and dependent variables of the General Theory are related to 
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probable repercussions between the factors and removes the simplifying assumptions previously 
introduced. After stressing the methodological continuity this method provides with the analysis 
of credit cycles in A Treatise on Money, we argue that chapter 18 is an indispensable tool to decode 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
In a now famous article of 1987, Greenwald and Stiglitz accused Keynes of having relied too much 
upon the ‚neoclassical and Marshallian tools‛ in drawing the summary of the General Theory in 
chapter 18 of the book. Keynes had ‚a novel, and markedly non-neoclassical vision of how the 
economy worked‛, they wrote, yet both the codification of Keynesian economics by Hicks, among 
others, and its presentation ‚in the form of a simple model as in chapter 18 of the General Theory‛ 
(p. 120) offered classical thinking an unhoped-for chance to resurge:  
 
It is a matter for regret that Keynes’ summary of his arguments in chapter 18 of the General 
Theory, and the formal modelling of Keynes' thinking by many later writers, relied so much 
upon the neoclassical and Marshallian tools which then, as now, were the style of the day. A 
much richer picture emerges from the General Theory taken as a whole (p. 127).  
 
Greenwald and Stiglitz even went so far as to define chapter 18 of the General Theory as ‚an early 
example‛  (p.  120)  of  Keynesian  economics  as  opposed  to,  according  to  Leijonhufvud’s  (1968) 
famous distinction, the economics of Keynes. This result may have been produced, they added in a 
footnote, by Keynes’s (and his expositors’) intention to demonstrate that by removing only a few 
‚basic  assumptions‛  of  classical  theory  it  would  have  been  possible  to  obtain  ‚dramatically 
different results‛ (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1987, p. 127). Yet the substance of the arguments remains 
the  same:  chapter  18  is  a  betrayal  of  the  General  Theory  and  of  Keynes’s  own  revolutionary 
reasoning. A summary of the General Theory made on neoclassical-Marshallian bases is at any rate 
misleading and obscures the reachness of the General Theory ‚taken as a whole‛.  
These remarks have particular relevance, since Greenwald and Stiglitz are certainly not 
hostile  to  Keynes’s  thinking,  whereas  traditional  criticisms  of  the  General Theory  have  accused 
Keynes of being too much detached from neoclassical economists. It comes therefore as no surprise 
that  the  post-Keynesian  strand  has  immediately  tried  to  challenge  Greenwald  and  Stiglitz’s 
interpretation. Sardoni can claim the merit of pioneering research in this precise regard: in his 
1989-90 article, he showed that drastically different interpretations of chapter 18 were possible and, 
to some extent, had already been advanced in the literature: Shackle (1967), in Sardoni’s view, had 
rightly considered chapter 18 as the expression of ‚a new philosophy of explanation of economic 
reality‛ (Sardoni 1989-90, p. 293). The aim of our paper is to throw light on the reasons which have 
wrongly induced Greenwald and Stiglitz to condemn Keynes’s summary of the General Theory in 
chapter 18, and to suggest an explanation of the chapter itself as both an indispensable tool offered 
by the author to its readers to decode the text structure of the General Theory and as a guide to the 
analysis of a complex economic material. In so doing, great value is assigned to the theoretical 
continuity between the General Theory and Keynes’s ‚essay on method‛, the Treatise on Probability. 
After a brief outline of the chapter and a presentation of the taxonomy of given factors, 
independent variables and dependent variables proposed by Keynes in it (section 1), we examine   3 
Keynes’s  methodological  criticism  of  the  ‚classical  theory‛  (section  2)  and  in  particular  the 
rejection of the ‚atomic hypothesis‛ on which the latter rests (section 3). We then show that the 
notions  of  cause  and  dependence  used  to  discuss  the  relationships  between  independent  and 
dependent  variables  in  chapter  18  are  in  truth  related  to  the  concept  of  ‚independence  for 
knowledge‛,  which  concerns  logical  connections  between  arguments  rather  than  material 
connections between events (section 4). The paper therefore insists on the difference between the 
Marshallian  partial  equilibrium  analysis  and  Keynes’s  analytical  method,  by  showing  that  the 
logical connections established in chapter 18 are explicitly rediscussed in chapters 19-21, where 
Keynes  allows  for  probable  repercussions  between  the  factors  (section  5.1)  and  removes  the 
simplifying  assumptions  previously  introduced  (section  5.2).  Section  6  draws  on  the 
methodological continuity this method provides with the analysis of credit cycles in A Treatise on 
Money, and on the importance of reader’s involvement in the General Theory. In the Conclusions, 
we claim that chapter 18 performs a fundamental role in helping the readers understand the text 
structure of the General Theory. This allows the paper to further an interpretation of the General 
Theory as a vademecum to the complex economic world and of Keynes’s theory of economics as a 
method, to be used by readers in order to emulate the author’s efforts to grasp the complexity and 
interdependence of the economic material.  
 
1. CHAPTER 18: AN OVERVIEW 
 
There will be an inducement to push the rate of new investment to the point which forces the 
supply-price  of  each  type  of  capital-asset  to  a  figure  which,  taken  in  conjunction  with  its 
prospective yield, brings the marginal efficiency of capital in general to approximate equality 
with the rate of interest. That is to say, the physical conditions of supply in the capital-goods 
industries, the state of confidence concerning the prospective yield, the psychological attitude to 
liquidity and the quantity of money (preferably calculated in terms of wage-units) determine, 
between them, the rate of new investment.  
But an increase (or decrease) in the rate of investment will have to carry with it an increase (or 
decrease) in the rate of consumption; because the behaviour of the public is, in general, of such a 
character that they are only willing to widen (or narrow) the gap between their income and their 
consumption if their income is being increased (or diminished). That is to say, changes in the 
rate of consumption are, in general, in the same direction (though smaller in amount) as changes 
in  the  rate  of  income.  The  relation  between  the  increment  of  consumption  which  has  to 
accompany a given increment of saving is given by the marginal propensity to consume. The 
ratio, thus determined, between an increment of investment and the corresponding increment of 
aggregate income, both measured in wage-units, is given by the investment multiplier. 
Finally, if we assume (as a first approximation) that the employment multiplier is equal to the 
investment multiplier, we can, by applying the multiplier to the increment (or decrement) in the 
rate  of  investment  brought  about  by  the  factors  first  described,  infer  the  increment  of   4 
employment (CW 7, pp. 248-249). 
 
‚The above is a summary of the General Theory‛ (p. 249), writes Keynes in chapter 18. A delusory 
summary, according to Greenwald and Stiglitz, since it closes the General Theory, in their view, in 
the restricted boundaries of a ‚simple model‛. Before moving to the chapter’s last section, dealing 
with some ‚conditions of stability‛ (p. 250) which help explain why the economic system is not 
‚violently unstable‛ (p. 249), Keynes adds a relevant part of the story and concerns himself with 
absolving the schematism of his reconstruction: 
 
An increment (or decrement) of employment is liable, however, to raise (or lower) the schedule 
of liquidity-preference; there being three ways in which it will tend to increase the demand for 
money, inasmuch as the value of output will rise when employment increases even if the wage-
unit and prices (in terms of the wage-unit) are unchanged, but, in addition, the wage-unit itself 
will tend to rise as employment improves, and the increase in output will be accompanied by a 
rise of prices (in terms of the wage-unit) owing to increasing cost in the short period. 
Thus the position of equilibrium will be influenced by these repercussions; and there are other 
repercussions also. Moreover, there is not one of the above factors which is not liable to change 
without  much  warning,  and  sometimes  substantially.  Hence  the  extreme  complexity  of  the 
actual  course  of  events.  Nevertheless,  these  seem  to  be  the  factors  which  it  is  useful  and 
convenient  to  isolate.  If  we  examine  any  actual  problem  along  the  lines  of  the  above 
schematism,  we  shall  find  it  more  manageable;  and  our  practical  intuition  (which  can  take 
account of a more detailed complex of facts than can be treated on general principles) will be 
offered a less intractable material upon which to work (ib.). 
 
As already noted by Hansen (1953), by referring to ‚other repercussions‛ exerting their influence 
on  the  position  of  equilibrium,  Keynes  is  straightforwardly  –  and  unsuccessfully,  as  the  early 
reception of the General Theory would seem to indicate – directing attention to the complexity of the 
economic system, to the extent that the schematism of the summary can be justified only by the 
usefulness and convenience to isolate some factors for purpose of offering a ‚more manageable‛ 
problem and a ‚less intractable material‛ to the economist.  
  Keynes has already explained how to achieve this result in the first section of the chapter, 
which relates to the nature of the factors and variables introduced into the analysis and the latter’s 
resulting schematism. The taxonomy includes: 
 
1. Given factors:   
‚the existing skill and quantity of available labour, the existing quality and quantity of available 
equipment, the existing technique, the degree of competition, the tastes and habits of the consumer, 
the disutility of different intensities of labour and of the activities of supervision and organisation, 
as well as the social structure including the forces, other than our variables set forth below, which   5 
determine the distribution of the national income‛ (CW 7, p. 245) 
 
2. Independent variables: 
‚the  propensity  to  consume,  the  schedule  of  the  marginal  efficiency  of  capital  and  the  rate  of 
interest‛ (ib.) 
 
3. Dependent variables: 
‚the volume of employment and the national income (or national dividend) measured in wage-
units‛ (ib.). 
 
Yet both ‚given factors‛ and ‚independent variables‛ deserve further analysis. As to the 
former, Keynes specifies that he is not assuming them to be constant, ‚but merely that, in this place 
and context, we are not considering or taking into account the effects and consequences of changes 
in them‛ (CW 7, p. 245). Moreover, these factors ‚influence our independent variables‛, he stresses, 
but ‚do not completely determine them‛ (pp. 245-46): this is the case of the marginal efficiency of 
capital, which depends on the existing quantity of equipment (which is a given factor) but also on 
long-term expectations (which are not). By contrast, all other factors (e.g. ‚what level of national 
income measured in terms of the wage-unit will correspond to any given level of employment‛, p. 
246)  which  are  completely  determined  by  the  given  factors  should  be  considered  as  being 
themselves given. As to the independent variables, in chapter 14 Keynes defines the propensity to 
consume, the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest as the ‚determinants‛ (p. 183) of 
the system. In chapter 18, however, he reminds that the schedule of the marginal efficiency of 
capital depends also on the prospective yields of capital-assets, while the interest rate depends on 
both the liquidity-preference and on the quantity of money (measured in wage-units). Therefore, 
the new taxonomy is as follows: 
 
1a. “Factors which we have taken as given” (but not as constant; p. 245):   
Factors outlined in 1. (see above) plus factors completely determined by them 
 
2a. “Ultimate independent variables” (p. 246; but: see below in the text): 
‚(1) the three fundamental psychological factors, namely, the psychological propensity to consume, 
the  psychological  attitude  to  liquidity  and  the  psychological  expectation  of  future  yield  from 
capital-assets, (2) the wage-unit as determined by the bargains reached between employers and 
employed, and (3) the quantity of money as determined by the action of the central bank‛ (pp. 246-
47); 
 
3a. Dependent variables: 
the volume of employment. 
   6 
Still,  Keynes  warns  soon  afterwards  that  we  are  not  in  presence  of  ‚ultimate  atomic 
independent elements‛ (CW 7, p. 247), since the given factors and independent variables ‚would 
be capable of being subjected to further analysis‛ (ib.). In this regard, he holds that  
 
The division of the determinants of the economic system into the two groups of given factors 
and independent variables is, of course, quite arbitrary from any absolute standpoint. The 
division must be made entirely on the basis of experience, so as to correspond on the one hand 
to the factors in which the changes seem to be so slow or so little relevant as to have only a 
small and comparatively negligible short-term influence on our quaesitum; and on the other 
hand  to  those  factors  in  which  the  changes  are  found  in  practice  to  exercise  a  dominant 
influence on our quaesitum. Our present object is to discover what determines at any time the 
national income of a given economic system and (which is almost the same thing) the amount 
of its employment; which means in a study so complex as economics, in which we cannot hope 
to make completely accurate generalisations, the factors whose changes mainly determine our 
quaesitum. Our final task might be to select those variables which can be deliberately controlled 
or managed by central authority in the kind of system in which we actually live (ib.). 
 
This passage has attracted the attention of a number of economists strongly disagreeing 
with  Greenwald  and  Stiglitz’s  criticism  (Sardoni  1989-90,  Harcourt  and  Sardoni  1994,  Fontana 
2001).  Such  authors  consider  Keynes’s  reference  to  ‚experience‛  for  drawing  the  distinction 
between given factors and independent variables as an introduction to the third section of the 
chapter, where the author, before proceeding with the analysis, reminds readers that  
 
the  actual  phenomena  of  the  economic  system  are  also  coloured  by  certain  special 
characteristics of the propensity to consume, the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital 
and the rate of interest, about which we can safely generalise from experience, but which are 
not logically necessary (CW 7, p. 249). 
 
Keynes then describes four conditions of stability, which ‚together are adequate to explain the 
outstanding features of our actual experience; – namely, that we oscillate, avoiding the gravest 
extremes of fluctuation in employment and in prices in both directions, round an intermediate 
position appreciably below full employment and appreciably above the minimum employment a 
decline below which would endanger life‛ (p. 254). First, as concerns the marginal propensity to 
consume, the multiplier relating the volume of consumption to an increase of output is greater 
than  unity  but  not  very  large;  the  marginal  efficiency  of  capital  is  such  that  changes  in  new 
investment are not in great disproportion to the change in the prospective yield of capital or in the 
rate of interest; money wages tend to vary in the same direction as changes in unemployment but 
not in great disproportion to them;  finally, a change in the  rate of investment  begins to react 
(favourably or unfavourably) on the marginal efficiency of capital if continued for a period which   7 
is not very large (so that fluctuations in one direction tend to reverse themselves in due course). 
Here  too,  Keynes  specifies  that  such  ‚‘natural’  tendencies‛  (ib.)  do  not  determine  a  ‚mean 
position‛  by  ‚law  of  necessity‛:  ‚the  unimpeded  rule  *these  tendencies  ‚are  likely  to  persist, 
failing  measures  expressly  designed  to  correct  them‛+  of  the  above  conditions  is  a  fact  of 
observation concerning the world as it is or has been, and not a necessary principle which cannot 
be changed‛ (ib.).  
  In sum, chapter 18 raises at least three major issues, roughly corresponding to the three 
sections in which it is divided: first, a seemingly reductionist summary of the General Theory with 
respect to the ‚much richer picture‛ emerging from the work ‚as a whole‛; second, a flexible or 
tolerant taxonomy of the given factors, independent elements and dependent variables entering 
the analysis; third, the role, in particular, of those ‚psychological propensities‛ which believed to 
ensure a certain degree of stability to the economic system. 
 
2. KEYNES’S METHOD AND THE CLASSICAL THEORY 
 
Chapter 18 is a somewhat surprising chapter. As the last of book IV, it should bring to conclusion 
Keynes’s  remarks  on  ‚The  Inducement  to  Invest‛.  Yet  the  chapter  restates  the  whole  General 
Theory: as seen, the summary of the book is preceded by a description of the independent and 
dependent variables of the system and the factors Keynes takes as given in the analysis; then, 
Keynes enumerates a series of ‚special characteristics‛ of the three independent variables, which 
explain why the system tends to oscillate round a position of less than full (but fairly above the 
minimum value of) employment. Furthermore, there are no evident reasons (exception made for a 
minor reference included in chapter 20; CW 7, p. 281) to believe that chapter 18 serves as a sort of 
prolegomena to book V (‚Money-wages and Prices‛). Chapter 18 seems to enjoy a special status, 
even in the context of a book which has a complex structure and presents chapters having ‚the 
nature of a digression‛ (CW 7, p. 37). It is thus reasonable to suppose that the chapter’s position in 
the volume conforms to specific requirements laid out by the author, although the reader might 
find it difficult to grasp their essence.  
An outstanding feature of the chapter is Keynes’s frankness in admitting the limitations of 
his  summary  of  the  General Theory.  Nor  could  his  reiterated  insistence  on  the  division  of  the 
elements  of  the  analysis  into  the  three  groups  of  given  factors,  independent  variables  and 
dependent variables easily go unobserved. In general, and paradoxical as it may seem, the reader 
is  left with  the  impression  that  the  author  felt  it  necessary  to  answer  in  advance  to  potential 
criticisms  of  the  same  character  of  those  made  by  Greenwald  and  Stiglitz;  as  if  Keynes  were 
anxious  to  remind  the  readers  that  there  was  much  more  in  ‚the  General  Theory  taken  as  a 
whole‛. There is – even on a pure linguistic level – a close connection between this latter remark 
by Greenwald and Stiglitz and Keynes’s intention to write a general theory, aiming at redefining 
neoclassical theory as one among many of its possible special cases. Suffice it to recall the Preface 
to the French edition of the General Theory, where Keynes states:   8 
 
I have called my theory a general theory. I mean by this that I am chiefly concerned with the 
behaviour of the economic system as a whole ... I argue that important mistakes have been 
made  through  extending  to  the  system  as  a  whole  conclusions  which  have  been  correctly 
arrived at in respect of a part of it taken in isolation (CW 7, p. xxxii). 
 
Keynes therefore locates a main flaw of the classical theory in the fallacy of composition which it 
engenders  by  wrongly  ‚extending  to  the  system  as  a  whole‛  conclusions  which  ‚have  been 
correctly arrived at in respect of a part of it taken in isolation‛. Chapter 19 is a the most vivid 
illustration of Keynes’s attempt to construct a general theory: in discussing the ‚supposedly self-
adjusting character of the economic system‛ as seen by the classics, and the ‚assumed fluidity of 
money-wages‛ (CW 7, p. 257) on which the argument rests, Keynes explicitly refers to ‚ignoratio 
elenchi‛ (p. 259), one of the thirteen types of fallacy of argument listed by Aristotle in Sophistical 
Refutations  (1928).  In  logic,  ignoratio  elenchi  is  regarded  as  an  informal  fallacy  of  relevance, 
occurring when the premises of an argument are irrelevant to, and incapable of, establishing the 
truth of the conclusion of the argument. In Keynes’s view, classical economists’ argument on the 
fluidity  of  money-wages  relied  on  an  unauthorized  transposition,  ‚without  substantial 
modification‛ (CW 7, p. 259), of demand and supply schedules for different products of a given 
industry to ‚industry as a whole‛ (ib.). Unauthorized, since  
 
the  demand  schedules  for  particular  industries  can  only  be  constructed  on  some  fixed 
assumption as to the nature of the demand and supply schedules of other industries and as to 
the amount of the aggregate effective demand. It is invalid, therefore, to transfer the argument 
to industry as a whole unless we also transfer our assumption that the aggregate effective 
demand is fixed. Yet this assumption reduces the argument to an ignoratio elenchi (ib.),  
 
for ‚the precise question at issue is whether the reduction in money-wages will or will not be 
accompanied by the same aggregate effective demand as before measured in money‛ (ib.). Keynes 
bitterly concludes that ‚if the classical theory is not allowed to extend by analogy its conclusions 
in  respect  of  a  particular  industry  to  industry  as  a  whole,  it  is  wholly  unable  to  answer  the 
question what effect on employment a reduction in money-wages will have. For it has no method 
of analysis wherewith to tackle the problem‛ (p. 260; see also Gerrard 1997).  
  It is no coincidence that Keynes uses the term ‚method‛ in this passage: the author of the 
General Theory is also the author of an essay on probability (A Treatise on Probability, 1921) outlining 
a general approach to epistemology which he later applied to economics in his economic writings. 
Chapter 19 is entirely centered on the distinction between the classics’ and Keynes’s ‚method‛: 
there, Keynes explicitly highlights the ‚difference of analysis‛ (CW 7, p. 257) which separates his 
work from that of the classical theory; this difference is of a methodological character. Keynes 
maintains that ‚it would have been an advantage if the effects of a change in money-wages could   9 
have been discussed in an earlier chapter‛ (ib.), but that this was not possible ‚until our own 
theory had been developed. For the consequences of a change in money-wages are complicated‛ 
(ib.). And he soon afterwards specifies that his ‚difference of analysis‛ with respect to the classical 
theory ‚could not be set forth clearly until the reader was acquainted with my own method‛ (ib.). 
Then, the reader infers that the problem with the ‚money-wages‛ argument of classical theory is 
that  it  offers  a  ‚general  explanation  *which  is+  quite  a  simple  one.  It  does  not  depend  on 
roundabout repercussions, such as we shall discuss below‛ (ib.).  
The passage helps understand why Fontana (2009, p. 30) can argue that theory and method 
have an ‚interdependent existence‛ in Keynes’s economics. But there is more: one would not be 
abusing of the meaning of ‚theory‛ in Keynes’s thought if s/he were to use the term as a direct 
synonym of ‚method‛. In the introduction to the Series of Cambridge Economic Handbooks (of 
1922-23), Keynes states that 
 
the theory of economics does not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately applicable 
to  policy.  It is  a  method  rather  than  a  doctrine,  which  helps  its  possessor  to draw  correct 
conclusions (CW 12, p. 151).  
 
In  contrast  to  classical  economists  and  to  the  positivist  application  of  the  method  of  physical 
sciences to economics, Keynes defines the latter as a ‚moral‛ rather than a pseudo-natural science, 
dealing with ‚motives, expectations, psychological uncertainties‛ (CW 14, p. 300) – that is with 
introspection and ethical values – so that ‚one has to be constantly on guard against treating the 
material as constant and homogeneous‛ (ib.). As a now wide literature has demonstrated, it is in 
the  Treatise on Probability,  which  is  in  truth  ‚a  work  of  philosophy  and  ethics,  concerning  the 
application of probability to the field of moral sciences and human conduct‛ (Carabelli 1988, p. 5), 
that Keynes fully developed his anti-positivist stance on the theoretical foundations of economics. 
His approach to probability stands in firm opposition to the frequency theory of probability: the 
Treatise deals with probability of propositions and, more in general, with the process of reasoning, 
rather  than  with  events  and  their  occurrence.  In  accepting  the  logical  theory  of  probability, 
however,  Keynes  rehabilitates  limited  knowledge  as  against  the  belief  of  classical  theory  that 
perfect knowledge is the only type of knowledge valid for science. Rather, Keynes holds that 
probability  is  ‚the  general,  because  the  commonest,  case  of  knowledge‛  (ib.,  p.  16),  thereby 
establishing probability rather than perfect knowledge as the main tool of science and economics 
with it. In so doing, Keynes draws attention to arguments which have a non-demonstrative and 
non-conclusive nature, that is to arguments justified by their connections with probability and 
limited  knowledge  rather  than  truth  and  perfect  knowledge.  ‚In  economics‛,  he  writes,  ‚you 
cannot convict your opponent of error – you can only convince him of it‛ (CW 13, p. 470). 
  This  approach  to  epistemology  provides  clear  continuity  with  Keynes’s  definition  of 
economics ‚as a method rather than a doctrine‛ or, as Keynes stresses in a 1938 exchange with Roy 
Harrod  concerning  the  latter’s  Scope and Method in Economics,  as  ‚a  branch  of  logic,  a  way  of   10 
thinking‛ (CW 14, p. 296), whose object, Keynes writes in the General Theory, is  
 
not to provide a machine, or method of blind manipulation, which will furnish an infallible 
answer,  but  to  provide  ourselves  with  an  organised  and  orderly  method  of  thinking  out 
particular problems (CW 7, p. 297).  
 
The  use,  in  such  definitions  of  economics,  of  terms  such  as  ‚machine‛,  ‚settled  conclusions‛, 
‚method of blind manipulation‛, ‚infallible answer‛, reflect both Keynes’s dislike for Harrod’s 
analogy between economic behaviour and the mechanical movement of physical bodies but also, 
and more in general, his rejection of positivism and his full awareness of the difficulty inherent to 
the attempt to applicate mathematical discourse to a moral science like economics. Economics is 
for Keynes a branch of logic, an apparatus of probable reasoning. Without logic, economists risk 
losing themselves in a mathematical wood of ‚pretentious and unhelpful symbols‛. Not ‚to lose 
sight of the complexities and interdependencies of the real world‛ in this labyrinth of symbols, the 
economist must adopt Malthus’s method, or at least the method of Malthus as revisited by Keynes 
himself, who praises the former for his ‚profound economic intuition and an unusual combination 
of keeping an open mind to the shifting picture of experience and of constantly applying to its 
interpretation the principle of formal thought‛ (CW 10, p. 108). 
This passage, and particularily the reference to the ‚shifting picture of experience‛, is of the 
utmost importance to understand what Keynes meant by logic. Keynes was in fact interested in 
developing  a  contingent  form  of  non-demonstrative  reasoning  relative  to  contexts  of  shifting 
reality. In fact, Keynes considered logical relations as objective; yet, believing that both thought 
and reality were multidimensional, he rejected the basic assumptions of metaphysical realism. In 
the  absence  of  an  absolute,  universal  theoretical  point  of  view,  theoretical  categories  must  be 
selective,  that  is  related  to  contingent  cognitive  circumstances.  This  transforms,  in  Keynes’s 
thought, the strong category of rationality into the weaker one of reasonableness (that is, relative 
to  changing  circumstances),  and  allows  Keynes  himself  to  develop  a  theory  of  knowledge  as 
probability, based on non-demonstrative and non-conclusive arguments. In defining economics as 
a  ‚method  rather  than  a  doctrine,  which  helps  its  possessor  to  draw  correct  conclusions‛, 
therefore, Keynes establishes the main task of the General Theory as that of helping economists 
avoid logical fallacies in reasoning of the kind of those affecting the classical theory. Hence the 
attempt to contruct, on the same bases on which his early criticism of Bernoulli’s principle of 
indifference, of induction and statistical inference rested in the Treatise on Probability (see Carabelli 
1988), a methodological criticism of the classical theory, consisting in making explicit to the reader 
the tacit assumptions classical economists had introduced into their analysis.  
At a first approximation, the classical theory seems to be an ‚organised and orderly method‛ 
helping its possessor to ‚draw correct conclusions‛. ‚Brought up in the citadel‛ (CW 13, p. 489), 
Keynes explicitly recognizes the strength of the classical theory, despite evidence of a ‚cleavage 
between  the  conclusion  of  economic  theory  and  those  of  common  sense‛  (CW  7,  p.  350).  But   11 
Keynes believes that this cannot be the (nor the main) argument for rejecting it: the ‚heretics‛ (CW 
13, p. 488) of his days mistakenly supposed that ‚common observation is enough to show that 
facts do not conform to the orthodox reasoning‛ (p. 489). On the contrary, for Keynes, observation 
is theory-laden, that is every act of observation implicitly includes a theoretical hypothesis about 
the material one is observing (see Carabelli 1988; in the Treatise on Probability, Keynes writes: ‚our 
'observations' are often the result of some manipulation, and the particular shape in which we get 
them is not necessarily fixed for us‛, CW 8, p. 231). This means for him that theory and logic, 
rather than mere observation, are required to raise doubts on a theory. Consistently, Keynes argues 
that  critics  of  the  classical  theory  cannot  reject  the  latter’s  conclusions  without  discarding  its 
premises, since the classical theory is, in this regard, perfectly consistent: ‚if orthodox economics is 
at fault, the error is to be found not in the superstructure, which has been erected with great care 
for logical consistency, but in a lack of clearness and of generality in the premisses‛ (CW 7, p. xxi).  
Rather, it is the task of chapter 19 to show that the classical theory is to be criticised exactly 
on methodological bases (see Carabelli 1991). The fallacy of composition referred to by Keynes as 
ignoratio elenchi is a logical mistake invalidating the generality of the theory, which extends to the 
system as a whole ‚conclusions which have been correctly arrived at in respect of a part of it taken 
in isolation‛. The problem with classical theory is its unwillingness to make explicit those tacit 
assumptions introduced into the analysis to support the generality and validity of its arguments, 
and in particular those connected with the notion of independence. Classical economists had in 
effect relied on the tacit assumption of independence of the real variables of the economic system 
from changes in the value of money; they had tacitly assumed the system to be always operating 
to its full capacity; finally, in passing from the individual to the general level, they had tacitly 
introduced a hypothesis of independence from changes in the level of community income (see 
Carabelli 1991; Gerrard 1997). Universality of space and time was inherent to these three tacit 
classical  assumptions:  ‚Say  was  implicitly  assuming  that  the  economic  system  was  always 
operating up to its full capacity, so that a new activity was always in substitution for, and never in 
addition to, some other activity‛ (CW 7, p. xxxv, emphases added); ‚the view that any increase in 
the quantity of money is inflationary ... is bound with the underlying assumption of the classical 
theory that we are always in a condition where a reduction in the real rewards of the factors of 
production will lead to a curtailment in their supply‛ (p. 304; emphases added).  
The General Theory is Keynes’s attempt to demonstrate that the tacit conditions imposed by 
classical economists have very limited validity. In the Preface to the General Theory, Keynes invites 
his ‚fellow economists‛ to ‚re-examine critically certain of their basic assumptions‛ (CW 7, p. xxi), 
and, in the ‚Concluding notes‛ of the book, he restates his work as an attempt to point out that the 
classical theory’s ‚tacit assumptions are seldom or never satisfied‛ (p. 378). The conclusions of this 
theory are as limited as their premises in generality and validity; and the generality of the theory 
irremediably reduced (‚Only if the equality held good, as the classical theory assumes, for  all 
levels of output, would it be true that there is nothing to check the increase of employment‛, CW 
13, p. 427; emphases added).    12 
 
3. MAKING SCIENCE WITH A COMPLEX WORLD: THE ATOMIC HYPOTHESIS 
 
How does chapter 18 enter this general story? There is a fil rouge linking Keynes’s insistence on the 
concepts of cause and independence in that chapter to his criticism of the classical theory and the 
construction of an alternative theory, but it resembles more a complex skein which readers are 
required – the ambivalent reception of chapter 18 shows the difficulty of the task – to disentangle. 
A main problem is that relevant parts of the thread pass outside the General Theory. In the Treatise 
on Probability,  Keynes  deals  with  the  logical  foundations  of  analogy  and  inductive  reasoning. 
Analogy is possible, he writes, in case of ‚limited independent variety‛ (CW 8, p. 280), that is 
when the premises of an argument belong to a finite system of facts – where ‚finite‛ means that 
the  amount  of  ‚independent  variety‛  made  up  by  the  system’s  constituents  and  the  laws  of 
connection between them is inferior to the number of its members. Keynes points out the logical 
nature of this principle: the application of the ‚atomic hypothesis‛ of limited independent variety 
to the material world amounts to considering it as a set of atomic units ‚each of them exercis*ing+ 
its  own  separate,  independent  and  invariable  effect‛  (p.  277).  This  means  that  the  ‚atomic 
hypothesis‛ which justifies inductive reasoning and mathematical calculus cannot be applied to 
organic complex systems (see Carabelli 1988). It cannot be applied to probability, in Keynes’s view, 
since  probability  has  an  organic  nature  (‚a  degree  of  probability  is  not  composed  of  some 
homogeneous  material,  and  is  not  apparently  divisible  into  parts  of  like  character  with  one 
another‛, CW 8, p. 32), nor to, in more general terms, the whole range of social disciplines, and 
economics makes no exception. In his 1926 Essay on Edgeworth, Keynes maintains that 
 
The atomic hypothesis which had worked so splendidly in physics breaks down in psychics. We 
are faced at every turn with the problem of organic unity, of discreteness, of discontinuity – the 
whole  is  not  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  parts,  comparison  of  quantity  fails  us,  small  changes 
produce  large  effects,  the  assumptions  of  a  uniform  and  homogeneous  continuum  are  not 
satisfied (CW 10, p. 262). 
 
The above catalogue of problems invalidating the use of the atomic hypothesis in psychics should 
be kept constantly at mind by readers of the General Theory, who find references, in the book, to 
the ‚complexities and interdependencies of the real world‛ (CW 7, p. 298). In Keynes’s view, the 
economic material possesses attributes of complexity which should induce the economist to reject, 
in  his  analysis,  the  blind  application  of  mathematics  and  statistics,  with  their  assumptions  of 
homogeneity, atomism and independence, to an object that is essentially vague and indeterminate, 
not  homogeneous,  not  divisible  in  homogeneous  independent  parts,  not  finite,  and  is 
characterized by organic interdependence. Yet the problem is not confined to an unqualified use 
of mathematics in economic analysis: indeed, it concerns science in general.  
In  his  youth  papers  on  aesthetics  (see  Carabelli  1988,  O’Donnell  1995,  Dostaler  2007),   13 
Keynes  discusses  the  relationship  between  science  and  art,  and  argues  that  science  possesses 
procedures which are similar to those of art. In particular, scientists make use of creativity and 
intuition, talents traditionally associated with the artist’s ability to appreciate beauty. In an early 
undated paper, Keynes (undated, p. 2) condemns the ‚supposed antagonism between the precise 
and verbal notions of philosophy and the organic, indivisible perceptions of beauty and feeling, 
between  those  things  which we  perceive  piecemeal  and  those  which we  perceive  as  wholes‛. 
Rather, he stresses the need of combining ‚the analytical and intuitive powers‛, the need for a 
collaboration of reason and intuition, of the piecemeal perception of the scientist-analyst and the 
synthetic perception of the artist, so that ‚knowledge and creation may advance together‛ (ib.). 
The  point  is  raised  again  in  Keynes’s  1909 essay  ‚Science  and  Art‛,  where  he  maintains  that 
scientists,  like  artists,  manifest  a  creative  attitude  in  their  research,  and  writes  of  a  ‚sudden 
insight‛ required to see through the obscurity of a scientific argument. 
  Now, as Keynes wrote as early as 1913, in Indian Currency and Finance, when confronted 
with a coherent economic system, wherein ‚every part fits into some other part‛ (CW 1, p. 181), 
the economist must keep in mind that  
 
It is impossible to say everything at once, and an author must needs sacrifice from time to time 
the complexity and interdependence of fact in the interest of the clearness of his exposition. But 
the complexity and the coherence of the system require the constant attention of anyone who 
would criticize its parts. This is not a peculiarity of Indian finance. It is the characteristic of all 
monetary problems (pp. 181-82).  
 
The analysis of monetary problems thus requires a theory and a method able to tackle organic 
interdependence among the variables at play without theoretically reducing the complexity of the 
system under investigation. Once organicism is introduced into the analysis, however, it ‚poses 
the problem of paralysis: what can one say except that everything depends on everything else?‛ 
(Chick 2003, p. 318). In stressing the organic nature of a monetary economy, the economist adopts 
the  synthetic  perspective  which  informs  the  artist’s  ability  to  perceive  things  as  a  whole;  but 
science  requires  requires  a  certain  degree  of  decomposability,  not  to  speak  of  the  need  to 
communicate  the  results  of  the  analysis,  at  an  epoch  when  the  techniques  of  the  modern 
economics of complexity were yet to be discovered.  
  In line with a tradition established in the  Treatise on Probability, also the General Theory 
restricts the validity of the mathematical formalisation of a system of economic analysis resting on 
the introduction of assumptions of ‚strict interdependence‛: 
   
It  is  a  great  fault  of  symbolic  pseudo-mathematical  methods  of  formalising  a  system  of 
economic analysis, such as we shall set down in section VI of this chapter, that they expressly 
assume  strict  independence  between  the  factors  involved  and  lose  all  their  cogency  and 
authority if this hypothesis is disallowed; whereas, in ordinary discourse, where we are not 
blindly manipulating but know all the time what we are doing and what the words mean, we   14 
can keep 'at the back of our heads' the necessary reserves and qualifications and the adjustments 
which we shall have to make later on, in a way in which we cannot keep complicated partial 
differentials 'at the back' of several pages of algebra which assume that they all vanish. Too 
large a proportion of recent 'mathematical' economics are merely concoctions, as imprecise as 
the initial assumptions they rest on, which allow the author to lose sight of the complexities and 
interdependencies of the real world in a maze of pretentious and unhelpful symbols (CW 7, pp. 
297-98). 
 
For such formalisation to be possible, the economist needs an ‚atomic hypothesis‛ which however, 
as seen, does not hold in a complex, organic system. Yet, it is Keynes himself, in chapter 18, who 
divides  the  ‚determinants‛  of  the  system  into  the  two  subgroups  of  ‚given  factors‛  and 
‚independent variables‛, and the literature has stressed the role of the ceteris paribus condition 
employed by Keynes to make theory possible. The adoption of this Marshallian tool in Keynes’s 
economics  is  easy  to  explain:  Marshall  too  had  a  conception  of  economics  as  fundamentally 
complex, and the ceteris paribus hypothesis – which consists in ‚breaking up a complex question, 
studying one bit at a time, and at last combining ... partial solutions [thus obtained] into a more or 
less  complete  solution of  the whole riddle‛  (Marshall  1961,  p.  366) –  is regarded  by  Keynes’s 
teacher as an analytical instrument required to make science with a complex material. 
In Keynes’s view, Marshall believes that the economic interpretation of ‚the complex and 
incompletely known facts of experience‛ requires the economist to go beyond the ‚bare bones of 
economic  theory‛  (CW  10,  p.  86).  Abstract  reasoning,  too  rigid  in  itself,  must  then  be 
supplemented by ‚trained common sense‛, and by the use of everyday language, which allow for 
‚shades  of  meaning‛  which  can  be  interpreted  ‚by  the  context‛  (Marshall  1961,  p.  51;  see 
Marchionatti  2010).  As  the  complexity  of  the  subject  increases,  however,  the  role  of  abstract 
reasoning is less important than in the earlier stages of economic analysis, and economic reasoning 
becomes,  in  Marshall’s  (1898,  p.  39)  conception,  ‚more  biological  in  tone‛.  This  amounts  to 
recognizing the limited role of mathematics: the mathematician ‚takes no technical responsibility 
for the material, and is often unaware how inadequate the material is to bear the strains of his 
powerful  machinery‛  (Marshall  1961,  p.  781).  Marshall’s  legacy  is  certainly  of  the  utmost 
importance for Keynes’s economics, which rejects the blind manipulations of mathematics and 
gives  a  prominent role to  ordinary  language.  As  seen,  moreover,  the summary  of  the  General 
Theory  appearing  in  chapter  18  rests  on  the  identification  of  ‚factors  which  it  is  useful  and 
convenient  to  isolate‛,  offering  to  the  economist  a  ‚more  manageable‛  problem  and  a  ‚less 
intractable material upon which to work‛ to his ‚practical intuition‛. Yet, in chapter 19, Keynes 
gives an account of his own method of economic analysis which neutralizes the use of the ceteris 
paribus condition  as  a means  to  obtain  partial  equilibrium:  the  ‚nature  of economic  thinking‛ 
requires  the  economist  to  exceed  the  limits  of  the  ceteris  paribus  condition  by  deliberately 
repudiating  those  same  ‚provisional  conclusions‛  reached  when  assuming,  within  a  purely 
logical, strictly finite time interval, ‚all other things‛ to be equal.    15 
 
The object of our analysis is, not to provide a machine, or method of blind manipulation, which 
will  furnish  an  infallible  answer,  but  to  provide  ourselves  with  an  organised  and  orderly 
method  of  thinking  out  particular  problems;  and,  after  we  have  reached  a  provisional 
conclusion  by  isolating  the  complicating  factors  one  by  one,  we  then  have  to  go  back  on 
ourselves and allow, as well as we can, for the probable interactions of the factors amongst 
themselves. This is the nature of economic thinking. Any other way of applying our formal 
principles of thought (without which, however, we shall be lost in the wood) will lead us into 
error (CW 7, p. 297).  
 
What emerges with clarity from this passage is that Keynes’s is a multifaced revolution. His 
attack on the classical theory denounces the introduction of tacit assumptions of independence 
into a vision of the economic system which is in truth intrinsically, and positively, modelled on the 
concept of interdependence. Keynes acknowledges the need of such assumptions to make science 
with a complex social world, but wants the economist to make them explicit in the course of the 
analysis, as happens with a declared use of the ceteris paribus condition. However, this latter too 
easily  conduces  towards  partial  equilibrium  analyses  of  the  economic  system,  so  that  the 
economist ends up with losing sight of the complexity and interdependency of the real world. A 
truly  general  theory  is  therefore,  in  Keynes’s  view,  a  theory  which  does  not  depend  on  the 
introduction of tacit assumptions of independence; a theory which is not universal in time and 
space, but is able to cope with different hypothetical cases characterized by different levels of 
dependence among the variables; a theory which allows for change and variability and permits 
them to play a central role in the analysis (see Carabelli 1991).  
 
4. ON THE NOTIONS OF CAUSE AND INDEPENDENCE IN THE GENERAL THEORY 
 
Gerrard (1997) has provided a masterly account of the analytical method proposed by Keynes in 
the General Theory. Yet the central theoretical elements of chapter 18, that is the notions of cause 
and independence, seem to deserve further attention and, in particular, a careful analysis of the 
legacy of the Treatise on Probability in this regard. As seen, for Keynes, the classical theory is to be 
blamed for the introduction of three tacit assumptions of ‚logical independence from‛ having the 
characteristic of universality in space and time. Keynes’s is a criticism of logical relevance. The 
concepts of logical relevance or irrelevance, and those of logical dependence or independence as 
well, are among the most important ones dealt with in the Treatise on Probability (this section draws 
on Carabelli 1988). It is in the context of a discussion on Bernoulli’s principle of indifference, and 
on the comparison of probabilities of different arguments in order to assess the preferability of one 
of  them  as  a  basis  for  belief,  that  Keynes  distinguishes  between  judgements  of  preference  or 
indifference and judgements of relevance or irrelevance. The former concern comparisons of the 
probabilities of arguments which have same evidence but different conclusions; the latter concern   16 
situations  in  which  the  arguments  have  the  same  conclusions  but  different  evidence.  Direct 
judgements  of  logical  relevance  concern  the  effect  that  the  probabilities  of  an  argument  are 
affected or not by the inclusion in the evidence of certain particular details. It is to be remembered 
that for Keynes, judgments of logical relevance are not absolute but relative to the ‚quaesitum‛, as 
well as to the particular circumstances in which the latter is raised. In the Treatise on Probability, 
Keynes considers a judgement of independence as a judgement of logical irrelevance; judgements 
of independence lie at the basis of the atomic hypotheses which justify  the application of the 
mathematical  probability  theory.  The  same  goes  for  classical  theory:  the  assumption  of 
‚independence from‛ is but a judgement of ‚logical irrelevance‛ of changes in the value of money, 
in the value of output and of income; judgements of independence and (that is) the introduction of 
atomic hypotheses justify formalisation through ‚symbolic pseudo-mathematical methods‛ and 
inform the use of partial equilibrium analysis.  
As to the concepts of cause and independence in chapter 18, we have already noted Keynes’s 
reluctancy  to  assign  to  the  variables  he  qualifies  as  independent  the  role  of  ‚ultimate  atomic 
independent elements‛ or even that of ‚ultimate independent variables‛. The reader is induced to 
interpret  the  continuous  refinement  proposed  by  Keynes  of  the  taxonomy  given  factors-
independent variables-dependent variables in terms of the author’s concern for a possible regressio 
ad  infinitum  in  the  analysis  of  the  independent  variables  of  the  system.  This  is  not  a  wrong 
impression. Yet, more probably, Keynes is trying to distance himself from a rigid interpretation of 
the notions of ‚cause‛ and ‚independence‛. And, more precisely, he is following a procedure he 
himself had described in the Treatise on Probability, in a three-page note on the use of the term 
‚cause‛. In the Treatise, as already observed, he chooses not to focus on the material connection 
between events, but on the analysis of the cognitive conditions which surround the assertion of a 
causal  connection.  The  first  formulation  of  such  contrast  is  given  by  Keynes  through 
distinguishing  between  causa  essendi,  or  ‚the  cause  why  a  thing  is  what  it  is‛,  and  causa 
cognoscendi, or ‚the cause of our knowledge of the event‛ (CW 8, p. 308); a second formulation is 
offered by the distinction between ‚causal dependence‛, which concerns material connections, 
and  ‚dependence  for  knowledge‛,  which  concerns  the  cognitive  conditions  of  the  connection 
which is asserted.  
Keynes does not associate the concept of independence with that of causality (rather, he 
established a connection, as seen, with that of relevance): this is because he deliberately chooses 
not to tackle the problem of the relationship between logical and empirical (material) relevance, 
that is the relation between causa essendi and causa cognoscendi. Yet, just as he perfectly knows that, 
albeit the two aspects are often confused, the adoption of the hypothesis of atomic uniformity in 
science  should  not  be  interpreted  as  the  acceptance  of  empirical  uniformity,  he  also  clearly 
distinguishes between objective dependence and ‚dependence for knowledge‛: in the Treatise, he 
contrasted Cournot’s and Yule’s views of probability to his own, stressing that the latter was based 
on  a  form  of  ‚independence  for  knowledge‛  which  ‚must  be  different  from  either  of  these 
objective forms of independence‛ (CW 8, p. 184). In a vision of economics as a branch of probable   17 
logic,  ‚cause‛ is threfore  a relative cognitive concept, a logical ground for believing, which is 
relative to particular circumstances. It is no coincidence that Keynes refers to ‚causal analysis‛ as 
‚strictly logical‛ in the 1933 draft of the General Theory (CW 29, p. 73). Causality is, in Keynes’s 
analysis, a rule to form propositions, resting on the use of the concept of causa cognoscendi and the 
attention this latter draws on having reasons for holding probable beliefs.  
More  in  general,  Keynes’s  preference  for  an  organic  rather  than  an  atomic  approach  to 
economics is connected with the use of ordinary rather than mathematical language. In the Treatise 
on  Probability,  Keynes  stresses  that  the  logic  of  probability  is  an  open  logic,  unlike  artificial 
languages (such as mathematical formalisation) with their members in finite number and their 
exhaustive alternatives: the idea is developed, for instance, when Keynes compares the logic of 
probability to the logic of colours and of similarity (CW 8, pp. 38-39). Only through ordinary 
language can the economist cope with the complexity of the economic material, Keynes remarks 
when opposing the ‚strict independence between the factors involved‛ assumed by ‚symbolic 
pseudo-mathematical methods of formalising a system of economic analysis‛ to the possibility, 
offered  in  the  context  of  an  ‚ordinary  discourse‛  of  keeping  ‚'at  the  back  of  our  heads'  the 
necessary reserves and qualifications and the adjustments which we shall have to make later on‛ 
(CW 7, pp. 297-298; see also Vercelli 1991). 
Now, when, in chapter 14, Keynes notes that the determinants of the system (the propensity 
to consume, the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest) ‚are, indeed, 
themselves complex and each is capable of being affected by prospective changes in the others. 
But they remain independent in the sense that their values cannot be inferred from one another‛ 
(CW 7, p. 183); when, in chapter 18, Keynes specifies that he does not ‚assume these factors to be 
constant; but merely that, in this place and context, we are not considering or taking into account 
the effects and consequences of changes in them‛ (p. 245); and when, in that same chapter, he 
draws the causal connections on which the summary of the General Theory rests, he is in truth 
using a ‚strictly logical‛ causal analysis and applying to the economic material the notions of 
logical relevance (that the values of independent variables cannot be inferred from one another is 
another way of saying that the judgment of relevance concerning these variables is unmodified) as 
well as of direct judgements of dependence or independence ‚for knowledge‛.  
Variables are always ‚taken as‛, and never shown to be, independent; the distinction itself, 
within the determinants of the system, between given factors and independent variables is ‚quite 
arbitrary from any absolute standpoint‛ (CW 7, p. 247, emphasis added); and after revisiting his 
taxonomy of given factors-independent variables-dependent variables, Keynes specifies that ‚we 
can sometimes regard our ultimate independent variables as consisting of ...‛ (p. 246, emphasis 
added), only to say, a few lines later, that the three independent variables just outlined ‚would be 
capable  of  being  subjected  to  further  analysis,  and  are  not,  so  to  speak,  our  ultimate  atomic 
independent elements‛ (p. 247, emphasis added). In short, in assigning the role of independent 
elements, Keynes is establishing connections between arguments and propositions, rather than 
between  events.  ‚Given‛,  ‚independent‛  and  ‚dependent‛  are  relative  to  the  economist’s   18 
‚quaesitum‛:  here  too,  the  Keynes  of  the  Treatise  on  Probability  (where  he  maintains  that 
judgements of relevance are relative to ‚some only of the known characteristics of the quaesitum, 
those characteristics, namely, which are relevant in the circumstances‛, CW 8, p. 113, emphases in 
the original) is just using his conception of judgements of relevance as not absolute but relative to 
the economist’s practical purpose of the analysis and the particular circumstances in which this 
quaesitum is raised. Then, Keynes specifies that the ‚final task‛ of the analysis is to ‚select those 
variables which can be deliberately controlled or managed by central authority in the kind of 
system in which we actually live‛ (CW 7, p. 247), while in his 1937 article in the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, he remarks that the General Theory might be summed up by saying that  
 
given the psychology of the public, the level of output and employment as a whole depends 
on the amount of investment. I put it in this way, not because this is the only factor on which 
aggregate output depends, but because it is usual in a complex system to regard as the causa 
causans that factor which is most prone to sudden and wide fluctuation (CW 14, p. 121). 
 
As seen, in summing up the General Theory in chapter 18, Keynes adopts – despite ‚the extreme 
complexity  of  the  actual  course  of  events‛  (CW  7,  p.  249)  –  a  criterion  of  usefulness  and 
convenience (‚these seem to be the factors which it is useful and convenient to isolate‛, ib.), so as 
to make the problem ‚more manageable‛ for our ‚practical intuition‛, ‚which can take account of 
a more detailed complex of facts that can be treated on general principles‛ (ib.). In so doing, 
Keynes  is  arguing  that  the  economic  material  retains  its  complex  nature  even  after  the 
introduction of such schematism; and that only our practical intuition, our ‚ordinary language‛ 
logic can tackle this complexity. That is, those intuitive direct judgements implied in the choice of 
independent  and  dependent  variables  also  play  a  fundamental  role  in  the  second,  wholly 
probabilistic (see Vercelli 1991) part of the analysis. It is Keynes himself to confirm this view, when 
describing this second part of the analysis as a stage in which – it is worth mentioning, here, that 
he is using the term ‚probable‛ in the sense of the Treatise on Probability, which adopts, as seen, a 
(neither frequentist nor subjectivist, but) logical conception of probability itself –, ‚after we have 
reached a provisional conclusion by isolating the complicating factors one by one, we then have to 
go back on ourselves and allow, as well as we can, for the probable interactions of the factors 
amongst themselves‛ (CW 7, p. 297, emphasis added). 
 
5. THEORY, METHOD AND COMPLEXITY IN THE GENERAL THEORY 
 
5.1 ROUNDABOUT REPERCUSSIONS 
Since Keynes argues that the economic material retains its complexity even after introducing a 
distinction between variables according to a criterion of ‚dependence for knowledge‛, and – what 
is more – that a general theory is such only if it refrains from introducing assumptions (worse, 
tacit  assumptions)  of  independence,  the  hypothesis  of  independence  inherent  to  the  use  of   19 
independent variables in chapter 18 is is nothing but, exactly, a hypothesis. ‚Acquainted with [the 
author’s+ own method‛ (CW 7, p. 257) as requested by Keynes himself, we are now in a position to 
understand the exact meaning of the ‚roundabout repercussions‛ analysed in chapter 19. Keynes’s 
method is directly opposed to the classical analysis, which rests on the tacit introduction of a 
hypothesis of fixed aggregate demand (‚whilst no one would wish to deny the proposition that a 
reduction  in  money-wages  accompanied  by  the  same  aggregate  effective  demand  as  before  will  be 
associated with an increase in employment, the precise question at issue is whether the reduction 
in  money-wages  will  or  will  not  be  accompanied  by  the  same  aggregate effective  demand  as 
before measured in money‛, p. 259), but also  
 
Let us, then, apply our own method of analysis to answering the problem. It falls into two parts. 
(i) Does a reduction in money-wages have a direct tendency, cet. par., to increase employment, 
'cet. par.' being taken to mean that the propensity to consume, the schedule of the marginal 
efficiency of capital and the rate of interest are the same as before for the community as a whole? 
And  (2)  does  a  reduction  in  money-wages  have  a  certain  or  probable  tendency  to  affect 
employment in a particular direction through its certain or probable repercussions on these three 
factors (p. 260, emphases added)? 
 
In Keynes’s two-stages analysis, the ceteris paribus hypothesis used in part (1) with respect to those 
variables which can be ‚sometimes regard*ed as+ our ultimate independent variables‛ (p. 246) 
immediately leaves room for a study, in part (2), of the repercussions of the reduction in money-
wages on the three factors, which is conducted in fully probabilistic (in the sense, recalled above, 
of the Treatise on Probability) terms. 
After answering negatively to question (1) – the volume of employment depends on the 
volume of effective demand, which in its turn depends on changes in the propensity to consume, 
in the marginal efficiency of capital and in the rate of interest –, Keynes analyses those ‚probable 
repercussions‛ which are lacking in the classical theory, and enumerates seven of them. The first 
repercussion is due to the reduction of money-wages inducing a reduction of prices, which leads 
to a redistribution of real income from wage-earners to other factors of the production, and from 
entrepreneurs  to  rentiers.  Keynes  explicitly  admits  that  this  transfer  is  likely  to  diminish  the 
propensity to consume. The same for the third repercussion, which, as happens with the second 
(though the final result is the opposite), is relative to an international system, where the reduction 
of  money-wages  relatively  to  money-wages  abroad  is  likely  to  induce  a  raise  of  investments 
through the increase of the balance of trade but also, for the same reason, to worsen the terms of 
trade, with the result that the reduction in real incomes may tend to increase the propensity to 
consume. The fourth and fifth repercussions concern expectations: the reduction of money wages, 
by increasing the marginal efficiency of capital, will be favourable to investiment (repercussion 
number 4), writes Keynes, if it is expected to be a reduction relatively to money-wages in the 
future, while it will have the opposite effect if the community expects money-wages to further   20 
diminish in prospect. Yet the reduction will reduce in any case the schedule of liquidity-preference 
for the community as a whole, thus raising investments (repercussion number 5); but here again, 
expectations play a fundamental role, although their effect will be of an opposite tendency with 
respect to the dynamics outlined in the fourth repercussion. Repercussions number 6 and 7 deal 
respectively  with  the  effects  of  a  reduction  in  money-wages  in  terms  of  the  general  tone  of 
optimism or pessimism they can produce on entrepreneurs (so that, in the most favourable case, 
they ‚may break through a vicious cycle of unduly pessimistic estimates of the marginal efficiency 
of  capital  and  set  things  moving  on  a  more  normal  basis  of  expectation‛,  CW  7,  p.  264)  and 
workers, and the negative influence of a greater burden of debt on the former.  
  Keynes then confirms that nothing positive may derive from the repercussions affecting 
community’s propensity to consume. Of the utmost importance for our purposes is however not 
the result of his reasoning, as the implications of the method here adopted. Keynes tells us that a 
reduction of money-wages cannot alter employment unless it affects effective demand, that is 
unless  there  are  significant  repercussions  on  the  three  factors  outlined  above,  namely  the 
propensity to consume, the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest. 
At the end of the analysis, he maintains that ‚there is ... no ground for the belief that a flexible 
wage policy is capable of maintaining a state of continuous full employment‛ (CW 7, p. 267). In the 
course of the analysis, however, he implicitly directs attention to the fluid nature of the taxonomy 
of variables sketched in chapter 18. After defining the three factors recalled above, in opposition to 
the classics, as the real ‚determinants‛ of the system, Keynes clarifies that they are ‚themselves 
complex and each is capable of being affected by prospective changes in the others‛, and that 
‚they remain independent in the sense that their values cannot be inferred from one another‛, 
which is exactly what he shows in relation to the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of 
interest in chapter 19. But he also maintains that a reduction in money-wages negatively affects the 
community’s  propensity  to  consume,  and  has  psychological  repercussions  affecting  liquidity-
preference and expectations of future yield from capital-assets: which means that in what we have 
here defined as the second stage of the analysis, a change in the value of an independent variable 
(money-wages) has repercussions on variables which are also defined as ‚independent‛ in chapter 
18  (the  point  is  noted  by  Gerrard  1997;  see  also  Asimakopulos  1991;  and  Togati  2006  for  a 
discussion of the variables taken as independent by Keynes). 
  In the first proof of the General Theory (chapter 18 was sent to the publisher at the end of 
March 1935: see Hirai 2008), Keynes points out that  
 
in some contexts it will reasonable to take, also, the motives affecting the readiness to consume, 
which I have distinguished in chapter II under the category ‚subjective‛, as amongst the given 
factors  of  the  system;  since  they  are  of  a  kind  which  as  a  rule  (though  not  invariably)  are 
unlikely to change materially within a short period of time. In this case we are left with two 
independent variables, the schedule of marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest (CW 
14, p. 503).    21 
 
This is a further confirmation of the fact that the notion of ‚independence‛ used in chapter 18 is in 
truth,  and  more  correctly,  ‚independence  for  knowledge‛,  and  that  the  second  stage  of  the 
analysis, allowing for the ‚probable interactions among the factors themselves‛, permits to get rid 
of the schematism when this same interaction induces to redefine the relationships between the 
variables themselves.  
 
5.2 EXPLICIT SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTIONS AND POSSIBLE COMPLICATIONS  
After repercussion number seven, Keynes explains that it was ‚not a complete catalogue of all the 
possible reactions of wage reductions in the complex real world. But the above cover, I think, 
those which are usually the most important‛ (CW 7, p. 264). The catalogue cannot be complete, 
Keynes argues, because the real world is complex, and in a complex real world, ‚we are faced at 
every turn with the problem of organic unity, of discreteness, of discontinuity – the whole is not 
equal to the sum of the parts, comparison of quantity fails us, small changes produce large effects, 
the assumptions of a uniform and homogeneous continuum are not satisfied‛ (CW 10, p. 262). 
Interestingly, from chapter 18 on, Keynes seems literally anxious to reveal to the reader, in his 
analysis,  the  complexity  of  the  economic  material  he  is  investigating  on.  This  way,  Keynes 
strengthens the methodological positions he has expressed in the four chapters which occupate an 
intermediate  position  between  the  pars  destruens  (chapters  2-3)  and  the  pars  construens  of  the 
General Theory (from chapter 8 on). Chapter 4 in particular is devoted to ‚the choice of units of 
quantity appropriate to the problems of the economic system as a whole‛ (CW 7, p. 37), a problem 
raised  by  the  complexity  characterizing  the  central  concepts  and  the  economic  magnitudes 
involved in the analysis of effective demand. The volume of real output or income, that of real net 
output,  the  stock  of  real  capital  and  the  general  price  level  are  defined  as  ‚incommensurable 
collections of miscellaneous objects‛ (p. 39); ‚the community’s output of goods and services‛, in 
particular, is ‚a non-homogenous complex which cannot be measured‛ (p.  38), since complex 
magnitudes, as Keynes writes in the Treatise on Money with respect to the value of money and the 
general  price  level,  are  ‚capable  of  variations  of  degree  in  more  than  one  mutually 
incommensurable direction at the same time‛ (CW 5, p. 88). 
  There  is  nothing  new  in  the  General  Theory  approach  to  complex  magnitudes,  which 
Keynes had already tackled in at least four previous writings: the Treatise of Probability, as seen, 
which  distinguishes  between  non-comparable  (the  general  case),  comparable  and  numerically 
comparable probabilities, and treats individual beliefs themselves as complex magnitudes; the 
1909  essay  on  ‚The  Method  of  Index  Numbers‛  (CW  11,  pp.  49-56),  where  Keynes  refers  to 
quantities that are in themselves incapable of measurement, such as individual prices, the general 
price level, the esteem standard and the wage standard; the  Tract on Monetary Reform and the 
Treatise on Money, with their analysis of the price level (see Carabelli 1992). To reassure readers, 
Keynes explains, in chapter 4 of the  General Theory, that such ‚conundrums ... of no solution‛ 
engendered by the need to treat complex, vague magnitudes are in truth not unsurmountable,   22 
provided economists renounce using ‚quantitatively vague expressions‛ (CW 7, p. 39) and opt for 
ordinary language: 
 
*these difficulties+ are ‚purely theoretical‛ in the sense that they never perplex, or indeed 
enter in any way into, business decisions and have no relevance to the causal sequence of 
economic  events,  which  are  clear-cut  and  determinate  in  spite  of  the  quantitative 
indeterminacy of these concepts (ib.). 
 
Still,  one  one  side,  Keynes  is  compelled,  by  the  want  to  avoid  such  otherwise  inevitable 
conundrums, to use the quantity of employment as a proxy for the volume of output; and ‚the 
causal sequence of economic events‛ itself shows evident traces of the complexity characterizing 
the economic material under investigation.  
In the summary of chapter 18, he brings problems of discreteness and discontinuity to the 
reader’s attention: no one of the factors he finds it ‚useful and convenient‛ to isolate ‚is not liable 
to change without much warning, and sometimes substantially‛ (CW 7, p. 249). Chapter 19 is 
wholly  centered  on  the  need  to  show  that  the  economic  material  cannot  tolerate  the  atomic 
hypothesis. Keynes in fact blames the classical theory for offering a ‚simple‛ (p. 257) ‚money-
wages‛ argument: an echo of the Treatise on Probability, where, recalling Augustin-Jean Fresnel, the 
French physicist (‚la nature ne s’est pas embarassée *sic+ des difficultés d’analyse, elle n’a évité que 
la complication des moyens‛), he maintains that ‚simplicity is a dangerous criterion‛ (CW 8, p. 
239); and he attributes this fault to the lack of ‚roundabout repercussions‛ (which by the way 
appear, on the contrary, even at the end of the summary of the General Theory in chapter 18) of 
changes in  money-wages  on  the  determinants of  the  system,  which he  tackles  in  the  chapter. 
Chapter  20  begins  with  expressing  concern  for  problems  of  organic  interdependence  among 
variables  and  consequently  of  measurement  (thereby  involving  failures  in  the  comparison  of 
quantity, but also discreteness, discontinuity, the lack of a uniform and homogeneous continuum), 
inducing Keynes to substitute the ‚employment function for the ordinary supply curve‛: this is 
held  to  be  ‚consonant  with  the  methods  and  objects  of  this  book‛,  he  argues,  since  the 
employment function ‚expresses the relevant facts in terms of the units to which we have decided 
to  restrict  ourselves,  without  introducing  any  of  the  units  which  have  a  dubious  quantitative 
character‛ and ‚lends itself to the problems of industry and output as a whole‛ (CW 7, p. 281, 
emphases added; see Carabelli 1992). 
The two-stages analytical method is employed, in the General Theory, as concerns not only 
the hypothesis of independence, but also the one of proportionality: Chapter 20 provides various 
illustrations of circumstances in which small changes produce large effects, or anyway of a lack of 
proportionality  between  causes  and  effects.  Initially,  Keynes  assumes  that  to  every  level  of 
aggregate demand there corresponds a unique distribution of it between the products of each 
individual industry of the system. When aggregate expenditure changes, however,  
   23 
the corresponding expenditure on the products of an individual industry will not, in general, 
change in the same proportion; partly because individuals will not, as their incomes rise, increase 
the  amount  of  the  products  of  each  separate  industry,  which  they  purchase,  in  the  same 
proportion, and partly because the prices of different commodities will respond in different 
degrees to increases in expenditure upon them (CW 7, p. 286, emphasis added).  
 
Keynes therefore brings the reader to recognize that  
 
the assumption upon which we have worked hitherto, that changes in employment depend solely on 
changes  in  aggregate  effective  demand  (in  terms  of  wage-units),  is  no  better  than  a  first 
approximation, if we admit that there is more than one way in which an increase of income can 
be spent. For the way in which we suppose the increase in aggregate demand to be distributed 
between different commodities may considerably influence the volume of employment (ib., 
emphases added).  
 
Moreover, with two final ‚practical qualifications‛ (CW 7, pp. 289-290) directing attention 
to the asymmetry between inflation and deflation of effective demand, Keynes violates the ‚crude 
quantity  theory  of  money‛  ensuring  the  system’s  equilibrium:  once  again,  as  in  chapter  19, 
(positive) changes in an independent variable, that is  money-wages (positively), affect another 
variable previously considered as independent, the propensity to consume, to the disadvantage of 
the rentier; and the process is likely to begin before full employment is attained, so that ‚if the 
rentier  is less  prone  to spend  than  the entrepreneur,  full employment  will  be reached with  a 
smaller increase in the quantity of money and a smaller reduction in the rate of interest than will 
be the case if the opposite hypothesis holds‛ (p. 290). And this same hypothesis may be subjected 
to change as a result of the rentier’s impoverishment.  
But the most interesting example of Keynes’s attempt to cope with the complexity of the 
economic material in the General Theory is probably offered by chapter 21 (Marchionatti 2010 takes 
it as an example of ‚right method of thinking‛ as against the ‚method of blind manipulation‛, p. 
134), where the author elaborates a theory of prices. Once again, the analysis is divided into two 
stages: first, Keynes introduces the  
 
simplification of assuming that the rates of remuneration of the different factors of production 
which enter into marginal cost all change in the same proportion, i.e. in the same proportion as the 
wage-unit (CW 7, p. 295, emphases added).  
 
Yet he immediately feels the necessity to  
 
simplify  our  assumptions  still  further,  and  assume  (1)  that  all  unemployed  resources  are 
homogeneous and interchangeable in their efficiency to produce what is wanted, and (2) that the   24 
factors of production entering into marginal cost are content with the same money-wage so long as 
there is a surplus of them unemployed (ib., emphases added).  
 
Keynes is thus able to reformulate the quantity theory of money as follows: 
 
So  long  as  there  is  unemployment,  employment  will  change  in  the  same  proportion  as  the 
quantity  of  money;  and  when  there  is  full  employment,  prices  will  change  in  the  same 
proportion as the quantity of money (p. 296).  
 
Once these ‚simplifying assumptions‛ are introduced, the second stage of the analysis requires 
the economist to allow for those ‚possible complications which in fact influence events‛ (ib.): 
 
(1) Effective demand will not change in exact proportion to the quantity of money. 
(2) Since resources are not homogeneous, there will be diminishing, and not constant, returns as 
employment gradually increases. 
(3) Since resources are not interchangeable, some commodities will reach a condition of inelastic 
supply  whilst  there  are  still  unemployed  resources  available  for  the  production  of  other 
commodities. 
(4) The wage-unit will tend to rise, before full employment has been reached. 
(5) The remunerations of the factors entering into marginal cost will not all change in the same 
proportion (ib., emphases added). 
 
As evident from this catalogue, Keynes is reaffirming the complex character of the economic 
material: the assumptions of proportionality on which the quantity theory of money rests are in 
truth  not  satisfied,  since  the  ‚complex  real  world‛  is  characterized  by  lack  of  proportionality 
between causes and effects, as well as of homogeneity and interchangeability. But there is even 
more to be noted: it is in fact no coincidence that Keynes explains the ‚nature of the economic 
thinking‛  (implying  the  need  for  the  two-stages  analysis  in  economics)  immediately  after 
discussing  the  nature  of  these  ‚complicating  factors‛  (CW  7,  p.  297).  As  seen,  Keynes  has 
accustomed his readers to interpret the ensemble of the ‚simplifying assumptions‛ introduced 
from time to time in the course of the analysis as the first logical step of a more complicated work, 
requiring  the economist  to remove  them  and  allow for  probable repercussions.  In  chapter  21, 
Keynes wants the reader to avoid supposing those same ‚possible complications‛ introduced to 
correct the illusory simplicity of the classical theory as ‚strictly independent‛ only in reason of 
their being considered ‚each of them in turn‛: 
 
We will consider each of them in turn. But this procedure must not be allowed to lead us into 
supposing that they are, strictly speaking, independent. For example, the proportion, in which 
an increase in effective demand is divided in its effect between increasing output and raising   25 
prices, may affect the way in which the quantity of money is related to the quantity of effective 
demand. Or, again, the differences in the proportions, in which the remunerations of different 
factors change, may influence the relation between the quantity of money and the quantity of 
effective demand (p. 297). 
 
The above is an example of ordinary discourse at work, permitting to ‚keep 'at the back of 
our heads' the necessary reserves and qualifications and the adjustments which we shall have to 
make later on, in a way in which we cannot keep complicated partial differentials 'at the back' of 
several  pages  of  algebra  which  assume  that  they  all  vanish‛  (CW  7,  pp.  297-298).  Reserves, 
qualifications and adjustments are necessary if the objects of investigation are ‚the complexities 
and interdependences of the real world‛ (p. 298). ‚The primary effect of a change in the quantity 
of money‛, writes Keynes using a variant of his concept of causa causans, ‚is through its influence 
on the rate of interest‛ (ib.). This makes the analysis quite easy: it suffices to derive this effect from 
the  schedule  of  (a)  liquidity-preference  (which  gives  the  reduction  of  interest  rate  needed  to 
induce  holders  to  absorb  the  new  money);  (b)  the  schedule  of  marginal  efficiencies  (for  the 
relationship between the reduction of interest rate and the increase of investments), and (c) the 
investment  multiplier  (for  the  relationship  between  increased  investment  and  consequent 
increment of effective demand).  
 
But  this  analysis,  though  it  is  valuable  in  introducing  order  and  method  into  our  enquiry, 
presents a deceptive simplicity, if we forget that the three elements (a), (b) and (c) are themselves 
partly  dependent  on  the  complicating  factors  (2),  (3),  (4)  and  (5)  which  we  have  not  yet 
considered. For the schedule of liquidity-preference itself depends on how much of the new 
money is absorbed into the income and industrial circulations, which depends in turn on how 
much effective demand increases and how the increase is divided between the rise of prices, the 
rise  of  wages,  and  the  volume  of  output  and  employment.  Furthermore,  the  schedule  of 
marginal efficiencies will partly depend on the effect which the circumstances attendant on the 
increase in the quantity of money have on expectations of the future monetary prospects. And 
finally the multiplier will be influenced by the way in which the new income resulting from the 
increased effective demand is distributed between different classes of consumers (pp. 298-299). 
 
The reader may note that Keynes introduces a recursive argument into the analysis (‚the schedule 
of liquidity-preference itself depends on how much of the new money is absorbed into the income 
and industrial circulations, which depends in turn on how much effective demand increases‛, emphasis 
added), and might give importance to the fact that the catalogue of possible repercussions, as 
often in the General Theory, is partial (‚Nor, of course, is this list of possible interactions complete‛, 
p. 299). Nevertheless, he argues,  
   26 
if we have all the facts before us, we shall have enough simultaneous equations to give us a 
determinate result. There will be a determinate amount of increase in the quantity of effective 
demand which, after taking everything into account, will correspond to, and be in equilibrium 
with, the increase in the quantity of money (ib.).  
 
Yet, this is of little interest to Keynes. He simply notes that ‚it is only in highly exceptional 
circumstances that an increase in the quantity of money will be associated with a decrease in the 
quantity  of  effective  demand‛  (CW  7,  p.  299).  Then,  he  remarks  the  affinity  linking  the  ratio 
between the quantity of effective demand and the quantity of money with the concept of ‚income-
velocity of money‛, and criticises the use of the latter. While in chapter 15 he has reminded the 
reader that the suggestion the concept carries of a ‚presumption in favour of the demand for 
money as a whole being proportional, or having some determinate relation, to income‛ (p. 194) is 
misleading, since the concept induces to overlook the role played by the interest rate, now he adds 
that the concept is ‚in itself, merely a name which explains nothing. There is no reason to expect 
that it will be constant‛, for it depends ‚on many complex and variable factors. The use of this 
term obscures, I think, the real character of the causation, and has led to nothing but confusion‛ 
(ib.). As the income-velocity of money is allowed to vary, it becomes possible to write down a 
‚generalised  statement  of  the  quantity  theory  of  money‛  (p.  305)  in  mathematical  formulas. 
However, Keynes attaches little value ‚to manipulations of this kind‛, since  
 
they involve just as much tacit assumpton as to what variables are taken as independent ... as 
does ordinary discourse, whilst I doubt if they carry us any further than ordinary discourse can. 
Perhaps the best purpose served by writing them down is to exhibit the extreme complexity of 
the relationship between prices and quantity of money, when we attempt  to express it in a 
formal manner (ib.). 
 
What in fact captures Keynes’s attention is a phenomenon whose understanding depends 
on the possible complications from (2) to (5), and one which cannot be usefully expressed in a 
formal manner: the combination of rising labour-costs (when wages are given irrespectively of 
workers’  efficiency)  as  output  increases  (with  the  rates  of  remuneration  of  different  factors 
showing ‚varying degrees of rigidity‛, CW 7, p. 302) and ‚bottle-necks‛ in the supply of particular 
commodities, both elements causing prices to increase before full employment is reached (thereby 
invalidating the quantity theory of money). This material proves to be quite intractable in a formal 
manner: bottle-necks are more easily reached when changes in effective demand are large and 
unforeseen rather than moderate, while ‚the psychology of the workers‛ (p. 301) on one side and 
‚the policies of employers and trade unions‛ (ib.) on the other concur to determine a series of 
‚points of discontinuity‛ (‚In actual experience the wage-unit does not change continuously in 
terms of money in response to every small change in effective demand; but discontinuously‛, ib.) 
at  which  ‚an  increasing  effective  demand  tends  to  raise  money-wages  though  not  fully  in   27 
proportion to the rise in the price of wage-goods; and similarly in the case of a decreasing effective 
demand‛  (ib.).  These  positions  of  ‚semi-inflation‛  (ib.),  Keynes  argues,  have  ‚a  good  deal  of 
historical importance. But they do not readily lend themselves to theoretical generalisations‛ (p. 
302). 
 
6. ON THE GENERAL THEORY AS AN OPEN SYSTEM OF THOUGHT: HINTS FROM THE TREATISE ON 
MONEY 
 
In the summary of chapter 18, Keynes mentions three possible ‚repercussions‛ of a change of the 
volume of employment on the schedule of liquidity-preference, but states that ‚there are other 
repercussions also‛ (CW 7, p. 249). In chapter 19, he argues that his catalogue of possible reactions 
of  wage  reductions  is  not  complete.  In  chapter  21,  the  ensemble  of  possible  complications 
invalidating the use of the simplifying assumptions previously introduced is left open-ended. The 
author of the General Theory constantly reminds its readers that in what we have here referred to as 
the  second  stage  of  the  analysis,  the  list  he  offers  of  probable  interactions  between  factors 
previously  isolated  for  sake  of  convenience  is  never  complete,  so  that  readers  themselves  are 
allowed to enlarge the catalogue with new ‚possible complications‛. After all, Keynes is not new 
to solicitations of this kind: the expedient is used also in the Treatise on Money. Chapter 20 of the 
volume is entitled ‚An Exercise in the Pure Theory of the Credit Cycle‛. Keynes knew that ‚some‛ 
of his readers ‚may prefer to leave this chapter out‛ (CW 5, p. 274); yet, to our knowledge, the 
literature  has  almost  completely  neglected  the  chapter,  thereby  failing  to  notice  the 
methodological continuity it provides with the General Theory.  
  In the terminology of the Treatise on Money, credit cycles are episodes of disequilibria of 
purchasing power (Keynes explains through the use of his fundamental equations that the price 
level is governed by the volume of money earnings of the factors of production, by the volume of 
current output and the relation between saving and investment) brought about by changes due to 
‚investment factors‛ (on credit cycles as described by Keynes in the Treatise on Money, see Vicarelli 
1984). The expression refers to divergences between the market rate and the natural rate of interest: 
the former may change either because of ‚altered conditions in the loan market due to a change in 
monetary factors‛ (CW 5, p. 232) or due to ‚the necessity of maintaining equilibrium between the 
rate of foreign lending and the foreign balance‛ (p. 233), while the latter may react to ‚a change in 
the attractiveness of investment or in that of saving‛ (p. 232). A credit cycle is thus defined as ‚the 
alternations of excess and defect in the cost of investment over the volume of saving and the 
accompanying seesaw in the purchasing power of money due to these alternations‛ (p. 249). Still, 
investment factors are only one of three sources of potential disturbance for purchasing power, the 
other two being monetary factors and industrial factors. Keynes reminds the reader the ‚broad 
distinction that [disturbances due to monetary factors] are due to changes on the supply side and 
[disturbances due to investment factors], generally speaking, to changes on the demand side‛ (p. 
248), and notes that while the former induce a passage from one equilibrium price level to another,   28 
the latter produces an oscillation about an ‚approximately unchanged‛ price level. Yet, he also 
remarks that 
 
The causes of disequilibrium to be discussed in this chapter [changes due to investment factors] 
are  not  always  separated  by  a  sharp  line  from  those  discussed  in  the  preceding  chapter 
[changes due to monetary factors], and, after the initial stage has been passed, they shade off 
into one another. For a disturbance initially due to monetary factors will soon set up some 
disturbance on the investment side, and similarly a disturbance due to investment factors is 
likely, as we shall see, to cause some modification to monetary factors (ib.). 
 
  Moreover, credit cycles are also affected by ‚income inflation‛ and ‚income deflation‛, that 
is by the ups and downs of costs of production, which ‚are unlikely to remain stable throughout 
the course of a credit cycle‛ (CW 5, p. 249). In sum, Keynes maintains that  
 
the actual course of events observable at any time will be a complex phenomenon resulting from 
the combined effects of changes in the costs of production and of the phases of the credit cycle 
proper. In common usage the term credit cycle has been applied to this complex phenomenon; 
and it will often be convenient to follow this looser usage (ib.) 
 
Finally, Keynes analyses credit cycles into three types – increased investments may in fact derive 
from i) substitution of production of capital goods in place of comsumption goods, total output 
being unchanged; or from increased working capital corresponding to increased output due ii) to 
addictional production of capital goods or iii) to addictional production of consumption goods –  
‚although those which actually occur are generally complex in type and partake of the character of 
all three‛ (p. 252). To this one should add that  
 
A phenomenon partaking of the characters of (i), (ii) and (iii) in varying degrees may also be 
complicated by the presence of some measure both of income inflation (i.e. of rising costs of 
production)  and  of  capital  inflation  (i.e.  a  rise  of  the  price  level  of  new  investment  goods 
relatively to their cost of production) (p. 253).  
 
Commodity and capital inflation tend to cause profit inflation, and this latter is likely to bring 
about income inflation due to increased competition among entrepreneurs to secure additional 
factors of production. Yet Keynes holds that ‚theoretically at least – it is possible to disentangle from 
these  complications  the  element  of  commodity  inflation  which  constitutes  a  credit  cycle‛  (ib., 
emphasis added).  
  What precedes provides striking methodological continuity with the analytical method of 
the General Theory. A credit cycle is a complex phenomenon mainly deriving from investment 
factors, which however interact with monetary factors in the course of the cycle. It follows that   29 
investment factors are only provisionally taken as independent variables, that is, the notion of 
independence used in the analysis has in truth the nature of ‚independence for knowledge‛: the 
closure is valid on a theoretical level only. Moreover, before summing up the characteristic phases 
of a credit cycle, Keynes observes that 
 
The possible varieties of the paths which a credit cycle can follow and its possible complications 
are so numerous that it is impracticable to outline all of them. One can describe the rules of 
chess  and  the  nature  of  the  game,  work  out  the  leading  openings  and  play  through  a  few 
characteristic end-games; but one cannot possibly catalogue all the games which can be played. 
So it is with the credit cycle. We will begin, therefore, by examining the three openings and then 
proceed to an analysis of the characteristic secondary phase (CW 5, p. 253).  
 
This surprising passage clearly reminds us of Herbert Simon’s later contributions (see, in general, 
Simon 1982) on bounded and procedural rationality, drawing on an analysis of chess game which 
perfectly matches such remarks by Keynes (see also Hoover 2006). In the introduction to chapter 
20,  Keynes  illustrates  a  ‚method‛  of  analysis  implying  the  introduction  of  ‚simplifying 
assumptions‛  which  make  the  example  (of  a  ‚particular  type  of  credit  cycle‛)  ‚somewhat 
artificial‛: 
 
I propose in this chapter to take a particular type of credit cycle and to work it out in full detail. 
Owing to the simplifying assumptions which have to be introduced in order to rule out the 
various complexities which are usually present in actual life, the example taken is somewhat 
artificial. Since, moreover, it does not add to the previous argument but only illustrates it, some 
readers may prefer to leave this chapter out. The method and ideas of the preceding chapters 
will,  however,  be  better  illustrated  in  this  way  than  if  I  were  to  cover  more  ground  less 
intensively (CW 5, p. 274). 
 
  Still,  after  describing  the  particular  model  of  credit  cycle  based  on  eight  ‚simplifying 
assumptions‛,  Keynes  ‚abate*s+  the  rigour  of  *the+  assumptions‛  (CW  5,  p.  280)  and  finally 
removes  these  ‚limitations‛  (p.  284),  thereby  allowing  for  ‚complications‛  which  are  ‚non-
essential‛ (p. 275) only in respect to the purpose of the analysis – that is, ‚to set out the essential 
mechanism‛:  
 
Let us begin by simplifying the problem so as to set out the essential mechanism (which, as we 
shall find, is substantially similar in the more generalised case) in a manner which is free from 
non-essential complications. Our initial assumptions, which will be removed later on, are as 
follows (pp. 274-275).  
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Among  the  simplifying  assumptions,  Keynes  obviously  enumerates  simplifications  implicit  in 
drawing the ‚standard case‛ (p. 274) of a credit cycle (for instance, current savings equal net new 
investment; the duration of the productive process is the same for all commodities, and so on), but 
also  limitations  in  the  absence  of  which  the  case  under  investigation ceases  to be  simple and 
artificial and becomes complex: it is thus assumed that there is no income inflation, that is that the 
money costs of production are constant; and Keynes underlines that it would be possible to treat 
‚various  irregolarities‛  in  this  respect,  but  they  ‚do  not  lend  themselves  to  a  generalised 
description‛, p. 288). Likewise, it is assumed that ‚the banks create just enough additional money 
for the industrial circulation, after allowing for any fluctuations in the amount of the financial 
circulation, to allow the absorption of the unemployed factors of production into employment at a 
steady  rate  ...  This  amounts  to  the  banks’  supplying  the  entrepreneurs  with  whatever  they 
require‛, p. 275). Nor can the economist always be content with removing a single limitation, since 
the non-fulfilment of the assumption, for instance that current savings equal net new investment 
makes the cycle ‚more complicated, and one can only describe its exact course if one first makes 
an assumption as to its exact character‛ (p. 285). Finally, it is to be noted that the eight simplifying 
assumptions, exactly as happens with those introduced in chapter 21 of the General Theory, are not 
independent one from another: for instance, the removal of the ‚no-hoarding hypothesis‛ (p. 288) 
or  of  the  assumption  of  equal  lenght  of  process  for  all  commodities  require  the  author  to 
distinguish between a situation in which the course of the credit cycle is ‚correctly foreseen‛ and 
one wherein ‚mistaken expectations‛ (p. 289) prevail, that is between a situation in which the 
eighth assumption (‚whatever mistakes may have been made in the past, all those concerned 
accurately forecast the subsequent course of the credit cycle‛, p. 276) is met and one in which it is 
not. 
  Now consider the chapter’s epilogue, where Keynes invites the reader to apply the author’s 
‚general system of thought here exemplified‛ for any possible extension of the argument: 
 
Evidently the possible ramifications and extensions of the foregoing argument are so numerous 
that  one  could  continue  for  many  more  pages  amplifying,  qualifying  and  generalising  it. 
Perhaps, however, it has been carried far enough to enable a reader, who has entered the general 
system  of  thought  here  exemplified,  to  apply  it  for  himself  to  any  further  interesting  cases 
which may occur to him (CW 5, p. 292).  
 
When Keynes’s writings are analysed in a linguistic perspective (see Gotti 2009, Marzola and Silva 
1994, Henderson 1995, Rossini Favretti 1989), ‚reader involvement‛ (Gotti 2009, p. 291) appears as 
an issue of the utmost importance: suffice it to note that the General Theory includes twenty-two 
appeal to the reader or instructions given to her/him (Henderson 1995). Gotti (1994) notices the 
attention  posed  by  Leontief  to  a  sort  of  ‚implicit  theorising‛  in  Keynes’s  work.  According  to 
Leontief  (1966,  p.  64),  Keynes  (as  do  all  ‚those  who  most  often  use  the  method  of  implicit 
solutions‛) ‚formulate*s+ a number of implicit theorems, extend the argument one or two steps   31 
forward or backward, and then let the reader find the way home by himself‛ (quoted in Gotti 
1994). In a similar vein, as Fontana (2009) recalls, Clower and Leijonhufvud (1975, p. 182) argue 
that ‚the Keynesian model imposes virtually no analytical discipline upon its users and thereby 
grants them essentially unrestricted analytical license". Gotti (1994) takes a different stance, and a 
less pessimistic one: in his opinion, Keynes ‚wished to stimulate the reader into a cooperative 
effort of interpretation of the book‛ (p. 175). In a passage worth quoting in full, Keynes himself 
confirms this view:  
 
When we write economic theory we write in a quasi-formal style; and there can be no doubt, in 
spite of these disadvantages, that this is our best available means of conveying our thoughts to one 
another.  But  when  an  economist  writes  in  a  quasi-formal  style,  he  is  composing  neither  a 
document verbally complete and exact so as to be capable of a strict legal interpretation, nor a 
logically complete proof. Whilst it is his duty to make his premises and his use of terms as clear as he 
can, he never states all his premises and his definitions are not perfectly clear-cut. He never mentions 
all the qualifications necessary to his conclusions. He has no means of stating, once and for all, 
the precise level of abstraction on which he is moving, and he does not move on the same level 
all the time. It is, I think, of the essential nature of economic exposition that it gives, not a complete 
statement, which, even if it were possible, would be prolix and complicated, to the point of 
obscurity, but a sample statement, so to speak, out of all the things which could be said, intended 
to suggest to the reader the whole bundle of associated ideas, so that, if he catches the bundle, he will 
not in the least be confused or impeded by the technical incompleteness of the mere words 
which the author has written down, taken by themselves. This means, on the one hand, that an 
economic writer requires from his reader much goodwill and intelligence and a large measure of co-
operation;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  there  are  a  thousand  futile,  yet  verbally  legitimate, 
objections which an objector can raise (CW 13, pp. 469-70, emphases added). 
 
  The  passage  perfectly  exposes  that,  in  a  general  conception  of  the  relationship  between 
scientists (economists) and their subject of study (beliefs held by economic agents) as capable of 
reciprocal  influence,  Keynes  believes  in  the  possibility  of  change,  and  consequently  uses 
persuasion as a tool for changing beliefs and opinions; but the concept of persuasion as applied to 
his  economic  work  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  artificial,  merely  rhetorical  expedient  easily 
associated with it. Rather, it is in the Treatise on Probability that the concept finds its roots: Keynes’s 
persuasion is a non-demonstrative logic consisting, coherently with a view of economics as a way 
of thinking, in providing (some) reasons for holding probable beliefs. But the passage also sheds 
light on the inevitable tension between what Keynes defines as the duty of the economist – that is, 
to make explicit the hidden atomic hypotheses introduced by scientist who tend to sacrify the 
organic  complexity  of  the  economic  material  to  the  purpose  of  making  science  with  more 
convenient theoretical tools – and the practical result of his theoretical effort. Yet Keynes clarifies 
that this tension should not be considered as a fatal and irremediable weakness of the manner in   32 
which this new way of thinking in economics is conveyed: the author must suggest to the reader 
‚a sample statement‛, ‚a bundle of associated ideas‛, which the latter will catch only if endowed – 
as shown in Chick (2006) – with ‚much goodwill and intelligence and a large measure of co-
operation‛. Gotti’s (2009) linguistic analysis of the General Theory in particular demonstrates that 
the apparent obscurity and ambiguity of Keynes’s work is ‚often employed to make his text more 
persuasive‛ (p. 299), the ‚subtlest and most effective strategy *being+ that which gives the readers 
the  impression  of  not  being  conditioned  by  him,  while  they  are  actually  being  led  along  the 
argumentative path which corresponds to the author’s original compositional plan‛ (pp. 299-300). 
In so doing, however, Keynes assigns to his readers ‚not merely the role of decoders and recipient 
of his views but a far more demanding role as his collaborators in working out the final form and 
the exact meaning of a new economic theory‛ (p. 298).  
 
CONCLUSIONS: CHAPTER 18 AS A GUIDE TO THE READING OF THE ECONOMIC MATERIAL AND OF 
THE GENERAL THEORY ITSELF  
 
As Keynes writes (CW 7, p. 245) at the beginning of chapter 18, ‚we have now reached a point 
where we can gather together the threads of our argument‛ and suggest an interpretation of the 
three major issues recalled above raised by chapter 18 itself, taking them, again with Keynes, ‚in 
the reverse order to that in which we have introduced them‛ (ib.). Let us begin, therefore, with the 
‚hypothetical psychological propensities‛ on which the stability of the economic system rests.  
  Dissimilarly from the above recalled strand of the post-Keynesian literature on chapter 18 
(Sardoni 1989-90, Sardoni and Harcourt 1994, Fontana 2009), we do not consider the third section 
in particular of the chapter as the loci where to find the fundamental difference between Keynes’s 
theory and general equilibrium models (while in the former, in Sardoni’s 1989-90 view, ‚the crucial 
variables on which the results depend are observable in reality – though in a different way from 
natural sciences – and, therefore, they can be given values – also observed in reality – that yield a 
relatively  stable economy,  in  general equilibrium  models,  observation of  reality  does  not help 
because  one  cannot  observe  the  crucial  variables  of  these  models‛,  p.  306). As  already  noted, 
Keynes believes observation to be theory-laden, so that the non-hortodox economist is bound to 
challenge the classical theory through logic and theory, and must not be content with registering 
the  gap  between  the  facts  and  orthodox  reasoning  through  ‚common  observation‛.  For  sure, 
‚experience‛ plays a fundamental role in the process of identifying the stability conditions of the 
system, but for Keynes the critic of the German historical school (which is content with historical 
facts and results, with using ‚empirical methods, and discards ‚formal analysis‛, CW 7, p. xxv), 
facts  do  not  speak  for  themselves.  When  referring  to  those  ‚special  characteristics  of  the 
propensity to consume, the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest, 
about which we can safely generalise from experience‛ (p. 249, emphasis added), Keynes is writing 
as the author of the Treatise on Probability, suggesting that if it is possible to ‚safely generalise from 
experience‛ about, say, the propensity to consume, this is because, despite obvious differences in   33 
human  consumption  behaviour,  this  ‚independent variety‛ is  ‚limited‛,  so that  generalisation 
about this social phenomenon is safe, that is justified (though it must be remembered that ‚in a 
study so complex as economics, ... we cannot hope to make completely accurate generalisations‛, 
ib.).  Even  when  posing  a  stress  on  experience,  Keynes  always  filters  it  through  logic,  as  this 
passage makes evident:  
 
Now, since these facts of experience [that is, the economic system is not violently unstable] do 
not follow of logical necessity, one must suppose that the environment and the psychological 
propensities of the modern world must be of such a character as to produce these results. It is, 
therefore, useful to consider what hypothetical psychological propensities would lead to a stable 
system;  and,  then,  whether  these  propensities  can  be  plausibly  ascribed,  on  our  general 
knowledge of contemporary human nature, to the world in which we live (p. 250, emphases 
added). 
 
  In the first proof of the General Theory, Keynes himself has established the seeds, in what 
later became chapter 18, for a fruitful collaboration between logic and experience, which however 
rests on a declared primacy of the former on the latter. Here is the original formulation (CW 14, p. 
504) of the passage concerned (the additional sentence, which does not appear in the final version 
of the General Theory, is in square brackets): 
 
Our present object is to discover what determines at any time the national income of a given 
economic system and (which is almost the same thing) the amount of its employment; which 
means in a study so complex as economics, in which we cannot hope to make completely 
accurate generalisations, the factors whose changes mainly determine our quaesitum. [Thus we 
begin  our  theoretical  study  with  the  premiss  that  changes  in  effective  demand  are  what 
matters;  and  we  then  procede  interspersing  our  logic  with  practical  judgements  based  on 
experience, to analyse the variables which can be regarded as chiefly significant in changing 
effective demand] Our final task might be to select those variables which can be deliberately 
controlled or managed by central authority in the kind of system in which we actually live 
(CW 7, p. 247). 
 
Of course, the ‚psychological propensities‛ do not follow of ‚logical necessity‛ (they do not form 
‚a necessary principle which cannot be changed‛, p. 254), since otherwise, they would raise to the 
status of a law of nature and make the system enslave of determinism, whereas Keynes believes in 
the possibility of human intervention by design (see Carabelli and De Vecchi 1999). In Keynes’s 
view  of  economics  as  a  branch  of  probable,  non-demonstrative  logic,  abstract  reasoning  is 
‚vitalized ... by the introduction of extraneous fact from the actual world‛ (CW 5, p. 125); history 
and experience may (and actually) alter the judgements of relevance lying behind the core of 
limited independent variety which Keynes exposes in chapter 18, and even the specific choice of   34 
the independent variables: suffice it to think about the Economic Consequences of the Peace, to the 
stability conditions of the pre-war order described by Keynes in the opening pages of the book, 
resting on ‚society *being+ so framed as to throw a great part of the increased income into the 
control  of  the  class  least  likely  to  consume‛  (CW  2,  p.  11),  and  to  the  effect  of  war  on  the 
‚psychology of society‛ (ib.), in particular that of disclosing ‚the possibility of consumption to all 
and the vanity of abstinence to many‛ (p. 13). In short, the judgments of relevance related to the 
choice of the independent variables draws on historical circumstances and social conditions, but 
the  hypothesis  of  relevance  is  of  a  logical,  neither  empirical  nor  material  nature,  and  strictly 
depends on the economist’s quaesitum. 
  The above provides a framework to understand also the second issue raised by chapter 18, 
the  flexible  taxonomy  of  the  given  factors,  independent  elements  and  dependent  variables 
entering the analysis, which has already been tackled in section 4. Yet, in our interpretation, this 
second  issue  is  strongly  connected  with  the  first  one,  that  is  with  the  starting  point  of  this 
investigation, the reductionist character of the summary of the General Theory drawn by Keynes in 
the chapter. Paradoxically though it may seem, Greenwald and Stiglitz are right,  at least to a 
certain extent (that is, they grasp only a part, the initial one, of the story), when claiming that the 
summary rests upon Marshallian-neoclassical tools. It is significant, in this regard, that in the first 
draft of the book, chapter 18 (chapter 20 of the first draft) was entitled ‚The Equilibrium of the 
Economic System‛ (CW 14, p. 502). Kriesler and Nevile (2002) interpret the change of the title as a 
sign  of  ‚declining  concern  with  equilibrium‛  (p.  105)  on  the  part  of  the  author,  whose  main 
interest is to study changes in output and employment. As a result of the investigation proposed 
in this paper, however, we rather think it reasonable to advance a different interpretation of the 
title change. The original title would have characterized chapter 18 mainly as the final destination 
of the theoretical journey proposed by Keynes in chapters from 1 to 17, whereas, in the light of 
what  precedes,  chapter 18  should  also  be considered  as  the  starting  point  (hence  the need  of 
‚restating‛ the General Theory) of a journey which is yet to begin.   
  The summary of chapter 18 is a synthetic representation of the results obtained exploiting in 
full the first stage of Keynes’s analytical method: in chapters from 1 to 17, Keynes has reached 
provisional conclusions on the macroeconomic system ‚by isolating the complicating factors one 
by  one‛,  that  is  by  the  use  of  Marshallian  ceteris  paribus  hypothesis,  of  causal  analyses  and 
assumptions of independence of classical flavour. Yet, that same chapter signs at the same time the 
beginning of the second stage of the analysis, when the economist ‚goes back on himself‛ and 
‚allows  for  the  probable  interactions  of  the  factors  amongst  themselves‛;  a  task  to  be 
accomplished  in  chapters  from  19  to  21.  Keynes’s  analysis  up  to  chapter  18  is  extremely 
revolutionary in content, if compared to the classics’ work, but the revolution is not complete, 
inasmuch as Keynes has not yet shown where exactly to find that ‚difference of analysis‛ which 
distinguishes  the  General Theory  from  the  classics.  Not  by  chance  has  Keynes  pointed  out,  in 
chapter 19, that his theory ‚could not be set forth clearly until the reader was acquainted with my 
own  method‛.  This  means  that  despite  the  Marshallian-neoclassical  tools  employed  in   35 
summarising  the  General Theory,  chapter  18  includes  an  account  of  the  author’s  revolutionary 
methodological  positions,  which,  however,  the  reader  might  fail  to  grasp  due  to  the 
interdependence of method and theory in Keynes’s economics. Still, in a way, it must be so: since, 
consistently with his own method, Keynes could not win the struggle against the classic citadel 
except by explicitly adopting, at an initial stage, the methodology of the classical theory, which he 
abandons later on, when he passed to the second stage of the analysis.  
  Where Keynes departs from the classical methodology is exactly in making explicit, in the 
summary of the volume, the assumptions of independence tacitly introduced into the analysis of 
chapters from 1 to 17. As the appendix to chapter 19 perfectly shows, in fact, Keynes considers the 
introduction of tacit assumptions into the analysis as the principal fault of classical theory, accused 
of  a  lack  of  adequate  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  the  characteristics  of  the 
theoretical tools adopted and those of the material to be treated by them. In the effort to make 
explicit the hidden hypotheses introduced by the classics, Keynes clearly assigns a fluid character 
to the independent variables, and frankly admits, making them subject to a potentially endless 
‚further analysis‛, the impossibility to indicate the ultimate, atomic independent elements of his 
analysis. In truth, he simply cannot do so, since the notion of independence he uses in the General 
Theory (chapter 18 playing a fundamental role in revealing this) is more precisely ‚independence 
for knowledge‛, which is the only kind of independence allowed to play a role in a study of the 
complex economic material. This explains Keynes’s proceeding (until chapter 18) by ‚provisional 
closures‛  which  he  removes  later  on:  for  instance,  writes  Chick  (2004;  for  the  open-system 
interpretation of the General Theory, see Chick and Dow 2001, Jespersen 2008), chapter 3 introduces 
the marginal propensity to consume as key to understand the relationship between demand and 
income, ‚but makes no attempt to explain investment when aggregating to output as a whole: it is 
taken  as  given‛  (Chick  2004,  p.  9),  as  happens  with  both  long-period  and  short-period 
expectations,  and  the  latter  are  also  taken  as  correct.  Then,  in  chapter  5,  Keynes removes the 
assumption that short-period expectations are correct, although the level of aggregate demand is 
still taken as given. This latter assumption is removed in chapters 8-10, which make an attempt to 
explain it through the consumption function, the multiplier and shifts in long-term expectations. 
Something similar occurs to chapter 19, as implicit in what precedes: up to that chapter, Gerrard 
(1997) notes, Keynes takes the wage-unit as a fixed independent variable. 
  Chapters 19 to 21 of the General Theory are constructed in such a way as to highlight the 
relevance of all those characteristics of complexity which induce Keynes to deny validity to the use 
of  the atomic  hypothesis  in  social  sciences  and  to reject  the  Marshallian  ‚partial equilibrium‛ 
method. In these chapters, the author concerns himself with the interplay between presumedly 
independent variables, and is bound to revisit the results of his analysis in the light of any possible 
repercussion dependent variables may have on independent elements. Chapter 21 in particular is 
conceived as an exercise in complexity, where simplifying assumptions previously introduced are 
removed later on, with an explicit admission that even the possible complications thus derived 
should not be treated as independent one from another. A relevant antecedent of this specific   36 
method is detectable in the Treatise on Money, and particularly in the analysis of the credit cycle 
(chapter  20),  where  Keynes  allows  for  roundabout  repercussions  between  variables heretofore 
enclosed in a seemingly rigid causal structure and gradually removes simplifying limitations, not 
without warning readers, as in the General Theory, that the list of possible complications can never 
be complete. Both the title (‚An Exercise in the Pure Theory of the Credit Cycle‛) and the structure 
of the chapter, truly conceived as a didactic exercise in pure theory, strengthen the interpretation 
here  proposed  of  Keynes’s  intention  to  provide  the  reader  not  a  complete  blueprint  for 
understanding economic reality, but a vademecum  – his works assuming the form of flexible, 
open-structure  theoretical  systems  of  thought  –  allowing  the  reader,  and  at  the  same  time 
requiring  from  him,  to  emulate  the  author’s  efforts  to  grasp  the  complexity  of  the  economic 
material. It has been rightly noted (Henderson 1995, p. 160) that after summarizing the General 
Theory in chapter 18, Keynes uses the personal pronoun ‚we‛ instead of ‚I‛: 
 
If we examine any actual problem along the lines of the above schematism, we shall find it 
more  manageable;  and  our  practical  intuition  (which  can  take  account  of  a  more  detailed 
complex of facts than can be treated on general principles) will be offered a less intractable 
material upon which to work (CW 7, p. 249). 
 
In  truth,  the  whole  chapter  uses  ‚we‛  instead  of  ‚I‛.  This  linguistic expedient  is employed  to 
stimulate cooperation between the author and its readers: the reader is constantly invited, in the 
General Theory, to ‚retrace with the author its route to knowledge‛ (Marzola 1994, p. 197), to follow 
Keynes in his emancipation from the classics. Interestingly, Keynes uses this expedient in both 
Chapter 18 of the General Theory and in chapter 16 of the Treatise on Money, ‚A Classification of the 
Causes of a Disequilibrium of Purchasing Power‛. The two chapters present a similar structure 
and de facto perform the same role: they provide the reader with a theoretical framework which, 
resting upon a concept of ‚independence for knowledge‛, needs to be ‚further analysed‛ so as to 
allow for the probable interactions of the factors (previously isolated) amongst themselves. This 
authorizes  the  historian  of  economic  thought  to  detect  in  the  book  implicit  or  even  explicit 
invitations  to  the  readers  to  adopt  the  author’s  method  and  continue  exploring  the  economic 
material accordingly.  
  In the General Theory, Keynes is not so explicit as in the Treatise on Money in inviting the 
reader to apply his system of thought to ‚any further interesting cases which may occur to him‛. 
This is due to the particular nature of the General Theory itself as a text whose internal structure 
reflects  the  theoretical  one  of  Keynes’s  argumentation.  The  open-ended  structure  of  the  book 
embodies  the  ambiguity  inherent  to  making  science  in  a  complex  world:  the  economist  must 
decompose  the  material  under  investigation  if  he  is  to  reach  valuable  conclusions  about  its 
dynamics, but his attempt is destined to crash against the complexity and interdependence which 
characterizes the material itself. This compels the author to offer its readers not only, and not so 
much, a complete theory about the economic system as a whole, but above all, and maybe only, a   37 
method to tackle its complexity. In truth, it could not be otherwise. As seen, Keynes’s definition of 
economics  as  a  moral  science,  and  as  ‚a  method  rather  than  a  doctrine‛,  is  tantamount  to  a 
rejection of positivistic methods and the ‚mechanical theory‛ of physical science (Keynes 1905). In 
Keynes’s economics, the analysis is voluntarily and explicitly left open-ended because there exists 
no theoretical limit to ‚further analysis‛: all closures are provisional, all simplifying assumptions 
are  temporary,  and  the  list  of  probable  repercussions  is  never  complete.  This  is  remindful  of 
Keynes’s  own  remarks,  in  the  Treatise on Probability,  on  the  problem  of  how  far  the  analytical 
process  is  to  be  pursued  by  an  individual  before  taking  a  decision  on  how  to  act.  Keynes’s 
approach is quite similar to the one developed by Sigmund Freud (1937) in one of his last articles, 
Analysis Terminable and Interminable, where he maintains that the termination of an analysis is a 
practical matter: the analysis may be an endless business (see Carabelli 1988). And it is certainly 
so, in Keynes’s work. This is due to the anti-positivistic nature of his theory of economics, which 
‚does not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately applicable to policy‛ (CW 12, p. 151, 
emphasis added), and does not even aim at offering ‚an infallible answer‛ (CW 7, p. 297, emphasis 
added). What Keynes’s theory does offer to his readers is in truth a method of analysis: if theory 
and method, in Keynes’s economics, seem to have an ‚interdependent existence‛ (Fontana 2009, p. 
30), this is because, in the end, they are the same thing. Bringing the argument to its conclusion, since 
the  General Theory offers  a  method,  or  a  theory  as  method,  rather  than  a  theory  in  the  sense 
traditionally  associated  with  the  term,  reader’s  involvement  is  a  necessary,  not  dispensable, 
requisite of Keynes’s own work. 
Chapter 18 plays a fundamental role in the General Theory. It may be said to accomplish 
three  different  but  interconnected  tasks:  first,  it  offers  a  powerful  illustration  of  how  Keynes 
believed it possible to make science, some decades before the develoment of complexity science, in 
a complex social world; second, it drives its readers to the analysis of a complex economic material; 
third, it provides them with a guide to the reading of the General Theory itself. Greenwald and 
Stiglitz are once again, and finally, right: ‚a much richer picture emerges from the General Theory 
taken as a whole‛. What they failed to note is that this is exactly what the indispensable chapter 18 
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